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In the spring of 1999, The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary all entered the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  These were the first former Warsaw Pact 
members to gain NATO accession since the Cold War ended with the dismemberment of 
the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact between 1989 and 1991.  
Now, seven more states are near the end of their accession talks.  Barring unforeseen 
events, all are expected to join the alliance in 2004. 
This thesis studies the 1999 round of NATO accessants, particularly in the short 
time period since they achieved membership, and garners lessons for the new round of 
NATO candidates.  It notes other significant events that led to NATO’s enlargement, 
including NATO’s post-Cold War transformation and the war in the Balkans along with 
courageous leadership.     
The thesis summarizes common themes, identifies differences, and suggests 
solutions that could be implemented for the next round of NATO entrants, as well as for 
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We have a window of opportunity in which to recast the foundation of this 
Alliance.  If we get it right, NATO will last for another fifty years.  And 
we will have succeeded just like the founding fathers of NATO did.  If we 
don’t, the U.S. and Europe are likely to drift apart and the Alliance will 
atrophy. 1 
       Madeleine Albright, 1997 
 
During the November 2002 Prague Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) invited seven aspiring countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia -- to begin accession talks to become a 
member of the alliance.  All of these states are moving swiftly to achieve the 
requirements necessary for membership.  Barring unforeseen events, all of these 
countries are expected to gain full membership in May of 2004.  These new independent 
states of Europe represent the second round of recent NATO enlargement, following the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland who entered NATO in 1999.  These two groups of 
countries are the first countries to join NATO since the end of the Cold War era.  Less 
than fifteen years ago, most of these countries did not exist in their present form.  Some, 
like Latvia, Slovakia, and Estonia, were parts of a sinking communist empire.  Others, 
like Hungary, Poland and Romania, were former communist countries tethered to the 
now disbanded Soviet Union through the now defunct Warsaw Pact.  As outlined by the 
demands of the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), each country was required to 
transform itself, both politically and economically as well as militarily, to be considered 
for membership in the transatlantic alliance.  While they all should be commended for 
having accomplished this to the extent necessary, none of them will receive a perfect 
score for fully meeting all the criteria.  In truth, neither the 1999 accessants, nor the 2004 
aspirants have entirely accomplished all of the criteria of the MAP.   
 
                                                 
1  Ronald D. Asmus, “Opening NATO’s Door”, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 178.    
2 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis will look at the integration of the 1999 NATO accessants and attempt 
to draw useful insights to benefit the 2004 aspirants states that will soon be integrating 
into NATO as members.  It will make policy recommendations to benefit both the 
aspirants as well as NATO where conclusions can be drawn.  At this point in time, the 
relevant questions about most of the 2004 aspirant states requesting NATO membership 
are not about the NATO accession process.  Barring any unexpected circumstances, the 
accession of the 2004 aspirants is practically assured.  The questions that need to be 
asked now are how will their integration into NATO likely go?  What can the second 
round entrants learn form the first round entrants?  What will be the easy parts of 
integrating fully into the alliance?  What will be the hard parts and what can be done to 
mitigate problem areas?  Are there ways to support these countries on the road to 
integration?  Is it likely that the new entrants will continue the integration process, or will 
some backslide from their commitments?   
The implications of any study that can identify effective ways to help improve the 
NATO enlargement and integration process are profound.  NATO’s transforming roles 
include missions for which the forces of many of its longstanding members remain 
somewhat unprepared.  The accession of new members extends the NATO commitments 
and transformation challenges even further.  The democratic institutions of both the 1999 
accessants as well as the 2004 aspirants are all less than fifteen years old and still 
maturing.  Integration is proving to be more of a challenge for them than some initially 
thought.  
There are several audiences that might benefit from this thesis.  First, defense 
representatives and policymakers from the second round entrant countries would be 
interested in answers to these questions.  Second, members and administrators within the 
NATO alliance itself should also be interested.  In spite of the short timeframe, the 
members joining in 1999 have already been criticized and there have been calls for a 
mechanism to remove members that enjoy the security NATO offers without living up to 
responsibilities the alliance requires.2  Third, the insights here may be of use to defense 
officials from NATO member states including the United States.  Lastly, the membership 
                                                 
2 Thomas S. Szayna, “NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and 
Shaping,” 2001, 14. Available from internet site http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1234/ [accessed 7/17/2003] 
3 
support community that helps these states achieve NATO membership as well as to 
support integration may also find the findings useful.  One such support organization is 
the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP).  Because this program is not 
widely publicized and its existence is missing from most of the literature about NATO 
enlargement, we will provide a brief introduction here, which should provide insight 
regarding how the findings of this thesis might support the objectives of the SPP.  
 
B.  INTRODUCTION TO THE STATE SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM (SPP) 
The National Guard’s State Sponsorship Program (SPP) has provided a significant 
support structure to help new independent states achieve their goal of NATO 
membership.  In spite of this, the program has kept a very ‘low profile’ and is practically 
unknown to the public and policymakers alike.  However, the SPP dovetails perfectly 
into the MAP to help countries meet the many military, political, and economic 
requirements of membership.  The SPP is a Department of Defense sponsored program 
that links a U.S. state’s National Guard Military Department with the defense 
establishment of a developing country in an effort to provide support.3  Without 
exception, the request by the new independent states of Europe for an SPP host was to 
support their goal to become NATO members.  By coordinating events and activities with 
the host nation, the National Guard has facilitated training and interactions needed to 
meet the requirements of NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP).  
The initial purpose of the SPP was to support the numerous new independent 
nations by using the various state National Guard organizations.  Coordination for the 
SPP is provided jointly by both the United States European Command (EUCOM) as well 
as the National Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C.  Since it was launched in 1993, the 
tremendous growth of the SPP is an indicator of its success.  It has been a driver to help 
the new independent states achieve their security goals in addition to helping to 
democratize the Central and Eastern European theater.  Over the last decade, the program 
has matured and grown well beyond Europe and is now active on a worldwide basis.  
Currently, there are 39 U.S. states that are assigned to assist developing nations through 
the SPP on all parts of the globe with additional programs coming on- line. Very soon, it 
                                                 
3 Fleming, Michael, “The State to State Partnership Program.”  NATO Review: WebEdition, No. 3 – May-June 
1997, Vol. 45, pp. 22-23.  On-line at: http://www.nato.int/doc/review/1997/9703-6.htm.  Accessed 1 May 2003. 
4 
is expected that the demand for the SPP will outstrip the capacity of the fifty-four 
National Guard Headquarters in the states and territories.4 
The SPP has continued to evolve and has developed objectives for the purpose of 
insuring NATO accession and integration, as well as helping to achieve other strategic 
objectives around the world.  The stated objectives for the European theater (i.e. 
EUCOM) are:  
· Demonstrate military subordination to civilian authority.  
· Demonstrate military support to civilian authorities.  
· Assist in the development of democratic institutions.  
· Foster open market economies to help bring stability.  
· Project and represent U.S. humanitarian values.  
 
A wide range of activities that often involve combinations of civil, military, and 
economic events support these objectives.5   
While it should be noted that the SPP was not established as a NATO program, its 
consistency with the MAP as well as the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs is 
striking.6  NATO encourages allies to develop activities “in the Spirit of PfP.”  The PfP 
offers partners increased opportunities to get acquainted with the militaries, governments 
and educational processes of the members states.  The National Guard SPP is among the 
most successful of these.7 Partnerships with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
are continuing, and each of the other seven states expected to gain membership in 2004 
have long-standing, mature state partnerships established as well. 
 
                                                 
4 Presentation by Lt Gen Gary Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau given at the 2003 SPP Planning 
Workshop, June 24, 2003, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  
5 John Groves, Jr., “PfP and the State Partnership Program: Fostering Engagement and Progress,” Parameters 
magazine on-line, Spring 1999, pp. 43-53, available at: http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/99spring/groves.htm. Accessed 3 May 2003]. 
6 The NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was launched in January of 1994 and is a military cooperation 
program that provides a way for countries that are not NATO members to maintain a strong level of association and 
cooperation for membership.  Some of the newly independent countries of Europe see it as a first step towards their 
long-term goal of NATO membership. 
7 Fleming, Michael, “The State to State Partnership Program.”  NATO Review: WebEdition, No. 3, May-June 
1997, Vol. 45, 22. 
5 
C.   FROM THE WARSAW PACT TO NATO ENLARGEMENT  
The reform of security and defense in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, 
as well as the seven 2004 NATO candidates arose from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact 
defense system as well as the Soviet style civil-military relations system, taking place in 
its entirety from 1989 to 1991.  This event was sudden and unanticipated in regards to its 
timing, and will continue to cataclysmically alter all history and the lives of billions for 
the foreseeable future.  This analysis will attempt to proceed, however, from recalling the 
shape and character of this process.  
A brief historical understanding of the Warsaw Pact system of control of 
militaries under their influence allows a better understanding of the distance Central 
European militaries must travel in order to integrate with the West.  The armies of 
Central Europe were re-organized after the Second World War and into the 1950s to be 
integrated within their so-called “military inner structure,” sometimes called “armies of 
the socialist type.”  In practice, to insure control after the cold war, this reform meant a 
dual system of command and control (i.e. adaptation of the Trotskyite model) that placed 
a member of the main political administration (i.e. a Politruk) of the armed forces serving 
alongside a line commander, who was also required to make a career in the party. This 
system was further reinforced by secret service cadres within the ranks as well as Soviet 
advisors being placed at the corps level of command.8  
In its international dimension, the Warsaw Pact -- including Prague, Warsaw and 
Budapest -- did have ministries of defense and general staffs of a kind.  But functionally, 
they were almost powerless.  All significant operational and strategic decision-making 
were handled by the united Warsaw Pact command headquarters, which existed under 
direct Soviet tutelage.  All senior officers had been schooled by the Soviets in policy and 
doctrine at Soviet general staff academies.9  Warsaw Pact forces were deeply integrated 
within the Soviet system.  This is in direct contrast to NATO’s system, where a diversity 
                                                 
8 Much of this general historical narrative can be found in an unpublished narrative written and provided to the 
author by Professor Donald Abenheim, National Strategic Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 
21, 2003.  
9 Ibid.  
6 
of opinion was both tolerated and greatly influenced the alliance as well as U.S. decision-
making.10 
When the Warsaw Pact disappeared in 1991 and the Soviets agreed to withdraw 
their troops from Central Europe, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe found 
themselves in an institutional and security vacuum.  The region’s governments realized 
that they lacked the capacity to defend themselves in what then appeared to be a highly 
unstable environment.  The post-Cold War period presented Central and Eastern 
European states with a host of security and political stability threats for which they were 
totally unprepared.11  Along with the institutions of political self-determination, the 
framework of civil-military relations in Central European states would need to be entirely 
re-built from the ground up.  Nevertheless, the great lesson for those charged with the 
rebuilding project is that a ‘cookie-cutter’ approach would not do.  Historical and societal 
context supremely matters.  In the Polish case, the historical relationship of the army with 
society as well as the role of the church supported the esteem of the armed forces, 
although the perception may not be appropriate by modern standards.  In the 
Czechoslovakian and Hungarian cases, the army was seen as a needless burden in 
national life, which had failed in the key moments.  Further, in all cases, life in the ranks 
of conscripts was a mindless and brutal time to be endured and was seen as just another 
facet of a life tethered to Moscow.  Such might have been slightly less the case in Poland, 
but all three shared this civil-military reality of a life in arms and alliances just the 
same.12  
 
D. INCUBATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT 
Probably the most significant element of NATO’s post-Cold War adaptation is 
not its enlargement but its transformation.  As the Cold War was coming to a close, 
determining what to do about an alliance, deve loped solely to fight the Cold War, needed 
to be addressed before enlargement could even be considered.  Could NATO still be 
                                                 
10 For numerous examples of the influence of the NATO member states on NATO decision-making as well as 
American foreign policy, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on 
U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1995.  
11 Zoltan Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies  (Cambridge, UK: The Press Syndicate of 
the University of Cambridge, 2003), 15. 
12 Abenheim, “Unpublished Narrative,” October 21, 2003. 
7 
relevant?  The history that led to the answer to this question has been addressed at length 
in many other works.  NATO’s role has evolved greatly and now emphasizes its power 
projection role.  This has evolved by broadly interpreting ‘Article 6’ of the original North 
Atlantic Treaty to include ‘out-of-area’ missions far outside the European theater, like the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan.  The role of 
NATO has also transformed itself by broadening the assumption of responsibility for 
European security, by use of “Article 10” of the Charter.  “Article 10” defines procedures 
for the admittance of new European members.  The answer to the transformation question 
greatly changed the dynamics of European security. 13  It was only when this happened 
that questions regarding the enlargement of NATO into Central Europe could be 
contemplated.   
NATO’s decisions regarding its future were being debated almost concurrently as 
the Soviet Union collapsed and broke apart, and the Warsaw Pact began to disintegrate 
starting in 1989.  Many feared the worst and the countries of Central Europe, in part, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, as well as East Germany clawed for the security under 
the umbrella of the only area of stability left -- to the West.  The merger of East and West 
Germany opened up new possibilities for the others.  Perspectives regarding how to 
proceed varied greatly. NATO gingerly began to entertain the possibility of future 
enlargement, first by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 
November of 1991 as a consultative body, thus bringing together the member countries of 
NATO with first nine -- then eleven -- new independent states of Central and Eastern 
Europe.  And later, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched.  PfP developed in 
January 1994 as a way to build relationships.  It was also a way to quietly support the 
demands of the new democracies.  It allowed the West to support new civil-military 
relations practices and to refashion Central European defense sectors against the chorus 
of opposition from Moscow.  Even the Russians were brought in the tent as a PfP 
participant.  While many might have first thought of PfP as a program with only a 
                                                 
13 Thomas S. Szayna, “NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and 
Shaping,” 17. 
8 
‘hypothetical’ use, cooperation was immediately tested when PfP states were called on to 
support peace enforcement actions in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere.14 
Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the political will would have emerged to make 
NATO enlargement a reality, had it not been for the war in the states of former 
Yugoslavia.  However, the war in Bosnia and elsewhere brought bitter memories of 20th 
century Europe into NATO’s backyard, in spite of efforts to ignore what was happening.  
European ethnic tensions reemerged, leading to a brutal war with the possibility that the 
conflict would spread to other states.  The war stoked repressed memories of refugees 
and accusations of genocide.  It occurred to many that perhaps Europe had not changed at 
all and, with the Soviet Union gone, only American hegemonic glue could hold the 
former Warsaw pact states together.  Additionally, after the failure of the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to keep the peace in former Yugoslavia, it became 
apparent to many that only NATO had the military attributes necessary to impose the 
peace.  As such, the new role for NATO was no longer geared to a hypothetically threat.  
The severe change in the emphasis of NATO’s purpose was hard for some to grasp and 
others to accept.  However, enough did accept NATO’s new responsibility emphasis to 
create the conditions to expand to alliance.  
Perhaps the desires to exist as a happy part of a civil-military Western model was 
somewhat a naiveté in the hearts and minds of those in central Europe.  For no single 
model could be said to exist, and the Central Europeans somewhat underestimated the 
congenital problems of security and defense that accompany civil-military relations in the 
Euro-Atlantic sphere.  In at least the Polish and Czechoslovak cases, nostalgia of happier 
times may have played a role.  These countries had been allies of the West from 1939 to 
1945 and their soldiers had fought the Axis integrated within United Nations forces.  The 
Hungarians, though coerced to serve with the Nazi’s during the Second World War, had 
been linked militarily with Central Europe for centuries, and naturally oriented 
themselves westward in the quest to distance themselves from their former oppressors.15 
                                                 
14 Several books have been written to outline in detail the progression of events leading to the enlargement of 
NATO during the 1990s.  One citation among many is by Ronald D. Asmus, “Opening NATO’s Door”, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002. 
15 Abenheim, “Unpublished Narrative,” October 21, 2003. 
9 
In the brief, hectic years of the first reforms, which then led to the decision by 
NATO in the fall of 1995 to embark upon the process of enlargement into Central 
Europe, the areas of effort concerned such things as:  
· The drafting of national defense legislation within new constitutions so as 
to provide a legal basis for defense as well as the drafting of national 
security strategies and defense doctrines;  
· The establishment of parliamentary oversight of the security and defense 
sector;  
· The re-establishment or establishment of ministries of defense and general 
staffs as well as the working out of an inter-agency process compatible 
with the NATO planning process;  
· The democratization of civil-military relations within the ranks of the 
armed forces, which, in practical terms, meant the re-assignment of the 
political officers and the reorientation of the officer corps to Western style 
roles and missions as well as the lessening of the burdens of service on 
conscripts (i.e. draftees);  
· The reduction in the size of offensively oriented central European land and 
air forces to expeditionary NATO missions -- first PfP as part of IFOR and 
SFOR;  
· The long process of interoperability with NATO which meant anything 
from a revision of logistics doctrine and equipment to the dictates of the 
PfP Planning and Review Process;  
· And most important, the use of the institutions of training and education to 
enable soldiers and defense civilians at all levels to participate in Euro-
Atlantic integration as equal partners through a decades long process of 
discovery, experiment and progress.16   
  
It has always been the case to some extent that NATO was asking aspiring 
countries to meet a large amount of criteria – both military and nonmilitary.  However, 
just because a country meets all of the elaborated pre-accession criteria does not mean 
that a country is guaranteed accession.  The act of inviting a state to join ultimately 
remains a political decision to be made by NATO members.17  Nevertheless, membership 
has always somewhat been linked to a country’s behavior in meeting criteria.   
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 “Study on NATO Enlargement”, NATO, September 1995, paragraphs 4-7.  Internet site 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictst/enl-9501.htm, accessed July 27, 2003.  
10 
By the late 1990s, the suitability for NATO membership, evolved greatly from the 
way NATO handled enlargement prior to 1989 during the Cold War. The first round of 
post Cold War NATO accessions, completed in 1999, was accomplished deliberately but 
without the benefit of much relevant experience.  The criteria for membership was 
refined, as the possibility of enlargement became a reality.  The original post Cold War 
criterion for prospective members – the so called “Perry Principles” -- was an evolving 
target but was generally established in September of 1995.  The main conditions 
included: 
· A functioning democratic political system (including free and fair 
elections and respect for individual liberty and the rule of law) and a 
market economy. 
· Democratic-style civil-military relations. 
· Treatment of minority populations in accordance with Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) guidelines. 
· Resolution of disputes with neighboring countries and a commitment to 
solving international disputes peacefully. 
· A military contribution to the alliance and a willingness to take steps to 
achieve interoperability with other alliance members.18  
This criterion, utilized for the 1999 accessants, has been further refined for the 2004 
aspirants and led to the MAP.  
 
E. MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN (MAP) 
PfP states that are singled out by NATO and its members as potentially important 
additions to NATO alliance are allowed to engage in a regular set of interactions and 
receive assistance though an outreach entity known as the Membership Action Plan 
(MAP).19  The MAP countries include the seven second-round aspirants expected to 
achieve membership in 2004 along with Macedonia and Albania – two that are being 
judged as not being ready for membership in the near future.20  The criteria for NATOs 
current Membership Action Plan (MAP) was developed as the process of the 1999 
                                                 
18 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” NATO - Online Library, September 1995, paragraphs 4–7 and 70–78; 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm, accessed July 27, 2003. 
19 Szayna, “NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping,” 
2001, 27.   
20 Ibid., 50. 
11 
accession states transformed themselves from their Cold War defensive posture into an 
organization dedicated to the collective and cooperative security of its members was 
ongoing.  A fair reading of the MAP criteria shows the extent to which the alliance has 
transformed itself.   
NATO’s 1999 demonstration of its commitment to enlargement has paid 
dividends in terms of regional stability.  It has provided the new independent states of 
Central and Eastern Europe an incentive to pursue reform and to settle disputes with 
neighboring countries.21  This is compatible with the fact that its mission has been 
extended to include conflict prevention and conflict management, both inside as well as 
outside its traditional boundaries.22  NATO’s current agenda is concerned with the 
democratization and integration of its members as well as its partners.   
In April of 1999, the MAP was ratified.  It formally outlined membership 
standards for aspirants that are close to the 1995 criterion for prospective members, but 
provided even greater detail regarding how to make membership accession a reality for 
those countries NATO chooses.  The Membership Action Plan is somewhat lengthy and 
is divided into five chapters. For the purposes here, the general criterion is as follows:23 
· Political and Economic issues – These include aspirants willingness to 
assume commitments under the North Atlantic agreement; settle disputes 
peacefully; demonstrate commitment to the rule of law and human rights; 
establish democratic control of armed forces; promote stability, economic 
liberty, social justice, and environmental responsibility; be willing to unite 
efforts in collective defense; share the responsibilities, costs, as well as the 
benefits of the alliance; participate fully in the Alliance decision making; 
and commit to the openness of the Alliance.  
· Defense/Military issues – Ability of aspirant to contribute to the 
collective defense; commitment to gradual improvement military 
capability; full participation in PfP; be prepared to share in the roles, risks, 
responsibilities, benefits and burdens of common security as well as 
collective defense; willingness to subscribe to Alliance strategy as set out 
in the Strategic Concept and other Ministerial statements. 
· Resource issues – Willingness of aspirant to commit sufficient budget 
resources to meet the commitments of membership, have national 
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22 Ibid., 1.   
23 “Membership Action Plan” (MAP), NATO, Press Release NAC S(99)66, 24 April 99, 
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structures in place to deal with those resources, participate in the 
Alliance’s common-funded activities at the agreed cost-shares. 
· Security issues – Upon accession, aspirant is expected to have sufficient 
safeguards and procedures in place to ensure the security of the most 
sensitive information as laid down in NATO’s security policy. 
· Legal issues – Aspirant should insure domestic laws are compatible with 
NATO rules and regulations and accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and 
other agreements required by membership.  
It is both striking and not by accident that the 1995 membership requirements as 
well as the current MAP criterion are very similar to the SPP objectives previously 
discussed.  
 
F. RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS 
As the performance of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland since joining 
NATO are reviewed within the case studies, it is important to note that there are still a 
few critics of further enlargement, although their numbers have dwindled greatly in the 
last five or so years.  While most agree that NATO has adapted and remains relevant in 
the new transatlantic security environment, there are issues undermining its long-term 
viability.  First, there are questions about the appropriateness and ability of the alliance to 
reorient itself to project power outside its traditional territory.  Additionally, 
consideration regarding what is in the strategic interest of the alliance is another question 
that could cause serious disagreements. 
Second, the current lack of an imminent challenger to transatlantic security 
provides an incentive for individual member states to contribute nothing (“free ride”) or 
contribute little (“easy ride”) to the alliance, leaving it to other members to take on a 
disproportionate share of the burden. 24  Already, there have been calls for a procedure to 
“sanction” or revoke the membership of states that do not contribute.25  Many states in 
the alliance are currently having difficulty generating the political resolve to keep their 
commitments.  Related to this is the exacerbation of the so-called “uncoupling” of the 
alliance. Problems of agreement regarding the ‘justice-of-a-given-cause’ are bound to 
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follow.   Having more members might make it more difficult to find compromises, and 
may cause both sides of the Atlantic to lose patience, so the argument goes.   
All of these arguments weaken when one considers the alternatives with an eye 
towards what happened in Europe in the 20th century.  For this reason, the majority of 
those in a policymaking role support NATO enlargement as evidenced by the fact that the 
second round of enlargement is proceeding as planned. 
To be sure, in the aftermath of the November of 2002 NATO Prague Summit, the 
situation today differs from that which the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland faced 
when invited to join NATO at the Madrid Summit in 1997.  Certainly, the MAP provides 
the new round entrants an advantage.  Nevertheless, the parallels are sufficiently great for 
the new invitees to benefit from the previous experiences, as will be covered.  Therefore, 
this thesis includes three case studies designed to determine what can be learned from the 
1999 accession that can be of benefit to the 2004 aspirants. 
The next three chapters are the cases studies of the 1999 NATO accessants.  
Chapter II will examine the Czech Republic, Chapter III will examine Hungary, and 
Chapter IV will examine Poland.  Each case study will discuss the history of each state’s 
progress of integrating into NATO since 1999.  It will look at how well integration has 
transpired since that time.  It will outline both the challenges that have been met as well 
as those still being faced.  It also outlines the successes and failures in the face of 
programs that have been undertaken to facilitate integration.   
Chapter V of the thesis will draw conclusions from the aggregate experiences of 
the three case studies and will try to see how those conclusions can be applied to support 
the integration of the 2004 aspirants.  It will also point out some differences between the 
circumstances of the two sets of states involved in recent NATO expansion (i.e. 1999 vs. 
2004) and why lessons may not always apply.  In general, it contends that, in view of the 
experiences thus far with the integration of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland 
into NATO, expansion can only be seen as a ringing success so far.  Nevertheless, NATO 
can count on continued challenges with the 2004 aspirants.  Where possible, Chapter V 
will propose solutions to the challenges of expansion.  It will also point out how some 
issues, often identified as problems associated with expansion, are actually more general 
in nature.  Lastly, this thesis will attempt to point out actions that both the aspirant 
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countries as well as the alliance members can take to address general problems in the 
alliance, as they apply to our case studies. 
 
 
G. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The three case studies included in this thesis will empirically assess the progress 
of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland after their 1999 accession into NATO.  It 
will also assess their future plans to continue to pursue full integration into the NATO 
security architecture and, were possible, will make a judgment as to what lessons can be 
garnered as the 2004 aspirants continue their accession process after membership is 
achieved.  As we look at each 1999 accessant, we will generally be reviewing the criteria 
outlined in the NATO MAP as it applies to integration.   
A variety of sources were used to develop this thesis and are outlined in the 
bibliography.  Primary sources include news reports, NATO publications, directives, 
plans, and presentations.  Secondary sources include newsletters, periodicals, 
professional journals, NATO publications, scholarly books, and essays as well as 



















II. INTEGRATION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC INTO NATO 
Prague, once the victim of the Warsaw Pact, became the city where the 
Warsaw Pact met its end as an instrument of the Cold War.  
President Vaclav Havel, July 1, 1991 
 
In March of 1999, the Czech Republic was one of the first three former Warsaw 
Pact members to achieve NATO membership along with Hungary and Poland.  These 
countries achieved membership after a significant debate within the alliance as to whether 
expansion was politically and strategically appropriate.  However, there is a difference 
between achieving NATO accession verses achieving NATO integration, in terms of a 
new entrant fulfilling its assigned security role.  At a time when seven more new 
independent states of Europe will most likely be approved for membership in May of 
2004, now is an excellent time to take stock of the progress of the 1999 round of NATO 
membership accessants to see what lessons can be garnered.   
This chapter offers a case study of the Czech Republic’s integration into NATO, 
four and one-half years after accession has been achieved to see what can be learned.  It 
looks at both the progress that the Czech military has achieved and the problems that it 
faces on an operational level.  It looks at causes of resource problems and finds that they 
are being driven by political factors partially due to the public’s perception.  It also looks 
at what effects these factors have had on integration and attempts to draw conclusions 
and make general recommendations. 
 
A.   HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The societal and historical context is shown to be playing a significant role in the 
progress of the Czech military.  In modern history, politicians have determined the fate of 
the Czech nation -- not the military.  The army was prepared to defend Czechoslovakia 
after the First World War.  However, it was mostly disassembled by politicians prior to 
the Second World War, leading to the Nazi occupation during the war.  Anti-military 
sentiments, developed by Czechs in the Austro-Hungarian period continued into the 
communist era.  Few citizens supported the communist government’s claimed fight 
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against the imperialist West.  At no time, did the army effectively intervene in any 
transformation process.  During 1989, it quickly became apparent that the army would 
not intervene in the political transformation, making it a non-player again.26  Once 
communism ended, effective civilian control of the military was almost automatic.27   
The armed forces were in a state of severe transformation when the Czech 
Republic, a relatively new independent state, was invited to apply to join NATO in 1997.  
In 1993 Czechleslovakia had just been divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 
what has become to be known as the “velvet divorce”.  By 1996, the Czech Repub lic was 
widely considered by some to be the strongest candidate for NATO membership at that 
time in spite of the state of the military. Slovakia, the former Czechoslovakia’s other half, 
was also considered a strong candidate at the time but its evolving domestic politics took 
a wrong turn and consideration of Slovakia for NATO membership was delayed.28   
During pre-accession talks in 1997, concerns about the Czech Republic’s ability 
to support NATO began to emerge as well.   Some members had difficulty reaching an 
agreement to invite the Czech Republic, based on the belief that the Czechs had little to 
offer the alliance and in view of the expenses they would generate for the alliance.  There 
were also concerns about a lack of enthusiasm from the Czech public for membership 
compared to the other candidates and the reluctance for Czech politicians to step up their 
military spending to a level necessary to make a military transformation. 29  Members 
questioned not only when, but if the Czech military would be far enough advanced to 
contribute to the collective defense of the alliance in view of the struggles they were 
having to reform. 30   Still very much a military in the style of the now defunct Warsaw 
Pact, it was apparent that the Czechs were having trouble meeting NATO standards.31   In 
the end, Czechs addressed the NATO members concerns to the extent necessary, and the 
                                                 
26 Maria Vlachová, “Professionalization of the Army of the Czech Republic,” The Challenge of Military Reform 
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Editors. (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2002), 34. 
27 Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil Military Relations, (Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense University Press Publications, 1996), 242. 
28 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door , 154. 
29 Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies , 23.  
30 Szayna, “NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping,” 
10.  
31 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door , 147. 
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Czech Republic was invited to meet qualifications to become an alliance member at the 
Madrid conference in July of 1997.  While membership was supposed to be finalized by 
December of 1998, the Czechs required an additional three months to address issues of 
compatibility with NATO air defenses, as well as to pass legislation in the Czech 
Republic that would permit them to comply with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty 
dealing with collective defense.32  Membership was finally achieved in March of 1999.  
In spite of the difficulties, the Czech Republic can only be commended for the progress 
they made in a short time frame allowing them to meet sufficient standards to be granted 
membership status. 
Like all of the 1999 NATO entrants, the Czechs still had significant work to do to 
achieve useful military integration into NATO after their membership had been achieved.    
The Czech Republic’s progress well illustrates that membership was not a cure for its 
ongoing problems.  Since 1999, NATO leaders have consistently criticized the Czechs for 
not meeting their own spending goals in order to speed integration. 33  NATO Secretary-
General, Lord Robertson, and Joseph Ralston, Supreme Commander of NATO Forces in 
Europe, have repeatedly expressed their concern and displeasure with the pace of military 
reforms and the lack of proper coordination and supervision in the Czech Republic.34  
During the first three years of membership, the Czechs had a slow start in meeting force 
goal timetables and are still having problems sustaining progress.   
 
B. OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATION 
The newly independent Czech Republic started out with even fewer advantages 
militarily than it had politically as it pursued integration with the West.  Because of the 
crushing of the “Prague Spring” revolt in 1968 and in keeping with Warsaw Pact 
doctrine, the Czechoslovak military was not allowed to develop a separate command 
structure.  As such, there were few defense and security experts around, in or out of 
government, when the Czechoslovaks received independence.  To address their security 
needs, the government copied a blueprint from Moscow’s security doctrine, which put the 
                                                 
32 Karel Kovanda, “Preparing for Membership,” NATO Review, Spring 2003, 
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33 Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies, I.  
34 Ibid., 27. 
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Czech military in “offensive” posture representative of the Warsaw Pact.  This blueprint 
had little applicability to today’s western security posture.35  The Czech Republic still 
lacked the experts who could articulate a detailed understanding of the inter-workings or 
requirements of the NATO alliance.  Whatever understanding did exist remained limited 
to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.  These people had neither a reason, nor 
a mechanism for making NATO membership a subject of wider public debate.36   
It really took unt il 2002 for the country to achieve a consensus over what type of 
military it wanted.  Even now, plans are being changed constantly in response to reduced 
resources.  From the beginning, there have continued to be stories of inefficiency, 
corruption, and misappropriation of funds.37  The political and transitional circumstances 
in the former Warsaw Pact states make the existence of these problems understandable, 
and they are certainly not unique to the Czech military. 
There have been many negative trends slowing the progress of the integration into 
NATO for the Czech Republic.  First, the office of Defense Minister has been a revolving 
door.  Due primarily to the frequency with which the Czech government has turned over, 
there have been twelve different Defense Ministers since 1993 and none have stayed for 
more than two years.  In coordination with the evolving administrations of the 
parliamentary majorities by whom they were chosen, each minister has had a different 
concept of how the ministry should work.  Most ministers did not even get an idea of 
what the military needed before they found themselves out of a job.  Concepts have 
changed constantly and military officers have not been held accountable to obtain 
results.38 
With the end of the cold war and the continuing modernization of weapon 
systems, military downsizing is a fact of life for all transatlantic militaries, but is 
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probably more difficult in the new independent democracies of central Europe.  In 
addition to a lack of continuity in the leadership positions in the Czech Republic, the 
continuing huge draw-down of forces from the 2002 level of 60,000 personnel, down to 
less than 45,000 personnel by 2006, means that several commanders and many military 
offices feel justifiably threatened to lose their well-paying jobs.  They sometimes have a 
hard time accepting continuing downsizing plans.  Like other countries including the 
U.S., it must be noted that the Czech military had already been cut by 40%, from an 
original force of 106,447 in 1993.39  However, to a degree worse than other places, it is 
often alleged that officers countermand, refuse, ignore, or use passive resistance in the 
execution of the orders required by the reform programs.   Additionally, because there are 
so many conscripts remaining that are no longer of significant use, two or three battalions 
sometimes need to be cannibalized to make one battalion to send abroad.  While Czechs 
have preformed well on peacekeeping missions, the remaining forces struggle at home 
and morale continues to be a serious challenge.  Currently, conscript soldiers that are 
being demobilized are overseeing, and sometimes stealing from, Communist era 
munitions stocks. 40   
Downsizing is just one problem that has arisen from the conversion of a former 
communist army into a modern western army able to support the alliance.  As in other 
former Warsaw Pact nations, defense intelligence continues to be problematic.  
Following numerous scandals, in April of 2003, the Defense Ministry leadership finally 
decided to disband and rebuild Military Intelligence.  Preliminary results of top-secret 
investigations into the intelligence services past shows that members of the service were 
extensively abusing their powers.  Its officers copied top-secret documents, computer 
files, and NATO materials.  These investigations have also shown that the intelligence 
did not only operate abroad, but also recruited agents and took part in operations within 
the Czech Republic as well.  Secret identities were created and clearances issued in a 
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manner that was not in keeping with current legislation. 41  In the end, it was decided that 
the military intelligence service could not be salvaged. 
Other concerns slowing integration involve questions about military procurement. 
While complaints over procurement decisions often arise in militaries, the charges tend to 
be even fiercer in new democratic states of Europe and elsewhere.  In the Czech 
Republic, the frequent turnover of the government probably also exacerbates these 
charges.  According to Jan Gazdik, a former officer and journalist knowledgeable on the 
Czech military, successive Czech governments have been accused of making political 
procurement decisions far different than what the military experts advise.  As a result, it 
is often alleged that budget appropriations have been used poorly.  The first well know 
incident of this was the infamous parachute scandal.  In 1996, the army bought a large 
quantity of newly designed parachutes.  A company that had never previously 
manufactured parachutes won the contract.   The parachutes were alleged to be of poor 
quality, causing several accidents and even one death.  Although it was clear that the 
parachutes were substandard and overpriced, the army kept purchasing them until the 
year 2000.  The result is that the army has stores full of useless parachutes according to 
Gardik.42  
Procurement concerns also plagued the Czech Air Force and have been a political 
and fiscal point of contention for many years.  A recent example involves the decision to 
buy Czech-made L-159 subsonic tactical fighter jets against the recommendations of 
NATO officials.  Many analysts feel that the purchase was aimed at rescuing an ailing 
industry.  In the short run, this purchase is taking 80% of the defense budget aimed 
towards appropriations.  The remaining 20% is not enough to modernize the remaining 
parts of the armed forces.  While second-guessing of purchase decisions is commonplace 
in all democracies, it seems to be more commonplace in discussing the Czech Military 
and may have to do with the lack of expertise previously discussed. 
Currently, the Czech Republic has the least capable Air Force of the three newest 
NATO members.  It uses forty substandard MiG-21 fighter planes in the supersonic class 
                                                 
41 Tomas Horejsi, “Minister Tvrdik to Replace Army Intelligence Chief.” Prague Lidove Noviny, April 8, 2003, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/czech/armyint.html, accessed September 12, 2003. 
42 Branston, “NATO: Czech Military Woes Prove Alliance Membership No Cure-All”, 2. 
21 
that will soon need to be scrapped because their service life has ended.43   Nevertheless, 
the Czechs have decided that it is important that they maintain the capability to protect 
their own airspace, in spite of NATO Secretary George Robertson’s recommendations to 
the contrary in February 2001.  Robertson noted that NATO air resources could be used 
to control Czech airspace in the short run, freeing money’s that could be put into other 
modernization projects NATO integration requires.44  In response to Robertson’s 
recommendation, Christian Democrat deputy chairman and former defense minister 
Miroslav Kalousek said, “the Czech Republic should be able to protect its airspace using 
its own forces in the future – otherwise it would be giving up its own sovereignty.”  
Kalousek noted that the only NATO countries that do not have the capability to protect 
their own air space were Iceland and Luxembourg.  Other voices echoed the call for new 
aircraft in spite of the fiscal drain that would delay the modernization of the army.45 
The future acquisition of Air Force assets has been debated since the origins of 
the Czech Republic.  In the late 1990s, the Czech’s were attempting to buy new 
supersonic fighters.  Due to questionable purchase practices and charges of corruption 
involving the bidding procedures regarding four of the five international bidders, the 
legislature shelved the acquisition in 2000.46  In the same time period, it was decided that 
the Czech Republic would push forward with the equivalent of one billion dollars to 
make the controversial purchase of the 72 Czech-made L-159 subsonic attack planes 
mentioned earlier.  While the number has been reduced, the purchase of these will 
continue to eat up most of the country’s defense budget earmarked for modernization for 
the next few years, though the military value of the planes remains somewhat in doubt.   
In addition to the L-159s, the Czech government still plans to spend an additional 
$1.6 billion for as many as 36 Western supersonic aircraft like the JAS-39 Gripen fighter, 
but the size of its defense budget makes this a long-term proposition at best.47  At the 
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present time, Czech officials are discussing possibly leasing aircraft when the MiG 
service life expires.48  
 
C. PLANS FOR REFORM 
Realizing that they had integration challenges that required tracking, in May of 
2001, the Czech defense department developed a comprehensive report entitled Two 
Years into NATO to help them track their progress.  The report notes that, during 
accession talks, the Czechs would not only avail themselves to opportunities relating to 
membership, but also fully stand up to their implied commitment.  The report intends to 
track the harmonization of NATO and Czech priorities.  It notes that “the public requires 
a fundamental reform of the Armed Forces to be necessary for appropriate national 
defense.”49  The reported noted diplomatically what was later stated by then Defense 
Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik when he said:  
In the past, too many senior members of the Armed Forces have not 
understood the importance of aligning the armed forces to be integrated 
into the NATO structure.  Yet, the NATO structure is what gives the 
Czech Republic its primary defensive and security capability.   
Specifically, the Czech military has not succeeded in applying principles 
of modern management.  As a result, the size of the armed forces and the 
fact that it remains primarily a force made up of conscripts has not been 
well addressed.  The current military has been resourced based on where it 
has been instead of where it is going.  There is not a linkage between 
requirements and resources.  Many NATO critical tasks have been 
assigned to reservists who are not deployable abroad under the Czech 
system and whose training has been of uneven quality. 50      
 
On May 14, 2001, the Czech government made the decision to establish the 
“Commission for Preparation of the Reform of the Armed Forces” and to place that 
commission directly under the Minster of Defense.  This commission was the primary 
planning body.  By August of 2001, this committee produced a draft of the Military 
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Strategy of the Czech Republic, which was developed and later ratified as policy by the 
parliament in April 2002 with alternations.  The strategy continued the refinement of 
plans to transition the military from its current conscription army to a smaller, fully 
professional force by the year 2006.  If successful, the Czech Republic will become the 
first former communist state in Europe to completely reform its armed forces from a 
conscription force to an all professional army in only six years – a plan that others are 
following. 51  Major General Jaroslav Skopek, former Deputy Minister of Defense, was 
put in charge of the development of the strategy and won praise for innovative 
approaches.  However, he warned that, “…there is a limit to the pace that changes can 
take place.”  He noted that it was important that the proposed budget be maintained to 
allow the reforms to stay on schedule.52  
The plan calls for a two-stage reorganization of the armed forces.  The first phase 
has already begun and will conclude by December 31, 2006.  By that time, the 
compulsory conscript system will be phased out in favor of professional soldiers.  The 
Czechs hope that their forces will be able to meet all of the commitments of the alliance 
as well as undertaking the required national defense tasking.  Unfortunately, the Czech 
government has fallen behind in funding these initiatives.53  
The second phase of the Military Strategy is projected to be complete between 
2010 and 2012, depending on the availability of resources.  By that time, the Czechs hope 
to achieve worldwide autonomous logistical support for long-term operations, a modern 
system of command and control, and interoperability with other allied forces.  They 
anticipate that force restructuring will be complete and will be divided between 
immediate reaction forces, rapid reaction forces, lower readiness forces, and reserve 
forces.  All of these forces are projected to fully meet NATO standards.54  
In addition to the reorganization of the armed forces, the Military Strategy outline 
plans to meet four broad strategic aims:  to be able to deploy forces abroad if action is 
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necessary; to be able to defend Czech airspace; to help in emergencies such as the floods 
of August 2002; and to have the capacity to bring reinforcements from abroad.55  
 
D. ASSESSMENT OF REFORMS  
On April 29, 2002, retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder 
conducted an assessment of the Czech reform plans on behalf of NATO.  General 
Schroeder was highly impressed with the Czech plans and the progress made at fulfilling 
them.  He noted that the entire planning process took place in only a little more than a 
year, in spite of the complexity of the task. He felt that the plans were comprehensive and 
thorough.  Much of the report discussed details of the basic force restructure, the 
professionalization of the military and the difficulties associated with the process.  It was 
noted that there are still many detailed programs that need to be established.  For 
example, the strategic concept calls for the creation of a Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), which still needs to be established.  With the creation of a new professional 
volunteer force, Schroeder estimated that it would take 15 years to establish a 
professional NCO and Officer corps because of the experience required in these 
positions. 56 
Possibly hinting at the history of Czech civil-military relations shortcomings 
throughout his report, Schroeder discusses the commitment required by the parliament as 
well as the military to make the tenets of the military strategy a reality.  The report 
stresses the need for the government to continue to fund the Czech army at the 2.2% of 
GNP budget amount that was promised.  As we will learn, the promise to fund the 
military at that level was quickly broken by the parliament in the summer of 2003.  The 
report stresses the need for the military and the parliament to interact and suggests that 
the military work harder to promote its requirements.  Schroeder discusses the need for 
the military to “market” the reform program, both within and outside the Czech military.  
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He notes that the passage of new legislation by the parliament would be necessary to 
implement the entire plan, again requiring support from the parliament.57   
Schroeder points out that the “devil is in the details”.  He stresses that better 
documentation outlining the functionality of all processes is required.  He also notes that, 
to be effective, a professional military requires a “merit based” Performance Evaluation 
System (PES), both to motivate the members and determine future promotions 
competitively.  The report also discusses the difficulties in making the cultural shift away 
from a cold war military mentality.  As such, the Czech needs to set up a system to recruit 
volunteers, based on human resource marketing models.  They need to develop a modern 
personnel system using a “life cycle management” approach.  They need to improve their 
system of cost forecasting using activity based costing models. They also need to set 
timelines for implementation of all these processes.  Lastly, Schroeder’s report stresses 
the need to address quality of life issues and acceptable standards necessary to maintain a 
professional military. 58  The Schroeder report appears to be an accurate assessment of the 
status of the Czech military, and correlates with strengths and weaknesses found within 
other sources of information. 
 
E.  FORCE RESTRUCTURING  
Force restructuring has been identified as job one for the Czech Army and is well 
underway.  While plans have been reduced recently, the 2002 Strategic Plan calls for 
forces to be reduced another 40-percent to between 34,000 to 36,000 personnel in 2006, 
with an additional 10,000 supporting civilian personnel.   Further, the strategic plan calls 
for these forces to be reinforced by 27,000 reserve forces.  Approximately fifteen to 
twenty percent of the overall Czech forces are to be made up of officers with the 
remaining enlisted members.  The expectation is that by offering forces better pay, career 
development, and pensions, the quality of recruiting and retention will be greatly 
improved at all levels.59 
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The force makeup will be a Ground Forces Mechanized Division and an Air 
Force Joint Air Division.  In response to recent terrorist threats, the reform also envisions 
the establishment of additional Special Forces.  By agreement within the alliance, the 
Czech Republic will specialize in providing small units that can be mobilized 
independently, designed to detect chemical and biological agents as well as provide 
passive surveillance systems under the so-called “Prague Initiative.”  The Czech Army 
will have a mobile unit for Passive Electronic Surveillance developed by 2006.60  
Like all of the Former Warsaw Pact countries, the Czech Military needs to 
develop a larger and better trained NCO corps and Junior Officer Corps and to encourage 
new officers to take greater initiative in line with modern Western military thinking. 61  
The army has been working to get away from top-down centralized thinking.   The ratio 
of officers, warrant officers, and NCOs is being altered significantly.  The officer corps 
will decrease while the number of Warrant officers and NCOs in the service will 
increase.   The main problem is how to develop warrant Officers and recruit and train 
extended-service NCOs quickly.  To date, programs have failed and the entire process is 
taking much longer than anticipated.62    
These types of changes inherently create concerns about civil-military relations 
any time an officer corps is reduced and officers are forced out.  Predictably, this has 
been reported as a concern in the Czech Republic.  In November of 2002, then Defense 
Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik was widely quoted in Czech newspapers for criticizing military 
commanders that he claims were obstructing reforms and subtly ignoring his orders.  At 
the time, Tvrdik painted a picture of an overstaffed, directionless army equipped with 
outdated munitions, plagued by theft, and unable to fulfill most of its tasks, save for 
participation in limited foreign missions.63 
While restructuring is designed to get the older generation out of the service, at 
times, just the opposite has been happening.  There have been press reports of an ongoing 
“brain drain” in the armed forces due to morale problems caused by the restructuring.  It 
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has been alleged that, instead of getting rid of the deadweight, many talented young 
officers have been leaving the service for the private sector.64     
 
F. MODERNIZATION EFFORTS 
As previously mentioned, around 80-percent of the modernization budget is 
currently being used for the purchase of new fighters.  The need to put the majority of the 
modernization budget into new fighters is because of the decision by Czech officials to 
maintain the ability to protect Czech airspace.  This decision will greatly slow other 
modernization projects that would speed the Czech Republic’s integration into the 
alliance.  In addition to the fighter procurement, another reason the Czechs have not 
modernized most of their other weapons systems to become interoperable with NATO 
systems is because they have decided to first focus on force restructuring.  The 
restructuring effort would seem to be the more appropriate way to begin in view of the 
limited resources.  Other purchases being planned, all of which are more affordable than 
aircraft, include radars, night-vision devices, and "smart" munitions.  Upgrades are 
planned for the Czechs' existing T-72 tanks, Mi-24 helicopters, and communications 
systems. The Czechs have also established a joint commission with Poland to help 
coordinate modernization programs.65 
 
G. NATO SUPPORT AND PERFORMANCE 
On its first operation after becoming an alliance member, the Czech Army was 
reported to have initially left a poor image among older NATO members including the 
United States.  Initial Czech conduct during Allied Force in Kosovo was reported to have 
been substandard compared to the other new accessants, Poland and Hungary.  The 
Czech’s required extensive tutoring from Brussels and Washington to perform 
effectively. 66  However, the problem was likely caused by a lack of enthusiasm for the 
operation on the part of the Czech public and their leaders because there was still 
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historical pro-Yugoslavian sentiment among the Czechs.  A majority of the Czech 
population opposed the air campaign and many officials in the government, as well as 
members of the opposition parties, were reported to have tried to distance themselves 
from their responsibilities to NATO at the time.67  In spite of this shaky start, Czech 
military performance in support of other NATO operations has been stellar.  Czech troops 
have performed particularly well in peacekeeping missions in Kosovo as part of KFOR, 
and in Bosnia as part of SFOR.  At any one time, about 175 Czech personnel are 
supporting KFOR in addition to an 85-person hospital battalion.  They have also 
maintained up to 500 personnel as part of the SFOR at one time.68  The Czech military 
has participated in setting up field hospitals in Albania, and has also participated in an 
elite anti-terrorist mission in Afghanistan within the last year as well.69   While the Czech 
soldiers have received praise as consummate professionals on most overseas missions, at 
home, it has sometimes been a different story due to the high number of conscripts and 
morale problems as previously mentioned.70  However, on balance, peacekeeping 
missions are felt to have a positive effect on both the esteem of the Czech military as well 
as the public’s perception.  Conflicts in the Balkans have demonstrated the value of 
armed forces in the European neighborhood.  The Balkan efforts also demonstrates the 
importance of professional armed forces in the modern security environment.71 
The Czech military has gained a very positive reputation for their work in 
defending against weapons of mass destruction.  Their nuclear-biological-chemical 
(NBC) defense units have long been a niche specialty for the Czech army that has proven 
well prepared to take part in a variety of operations.  NATO Secretary General George 
Robertson has said he would like to see the Czech Republic advance its NBC capabilities 
even further.72  A nuclear-biological-chemical defense company already is assigned to 
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NATO's Immediate Reaction Force.  The Czech foray into niche specialization is 
indicative of a growing trend in European militaries, as countries figure out ways to work 
with the United States in military coalitions with limited budgets.73  NATO officials  
hope that developing specialized units like these will be something that the Czechs can do 
more of in the future.74   
Czech officials have claimed that 78-percent of their current military is being 
made available for NATO missions at any one time, including 14-percent that will 
participate in the alliance's immediate and rapid reaction forces.  However, the Czech 
army is still made up of a large percentage of conscripts making it unlikely that a high 
percentage of their forces could be called upon simultaneously at this juncture.  The 
Czech Republic met its pledge to make a combat brigade available to the Rapid Reaction 
Corps by 2002. While one light airborne infantry battalion is considered ready today, the 
remainder of the Czech 4th Brigade is not to date.75  Nevertheless, the Czechs have lived 
up to their commitment to NATO by remaining active in Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
exercises since joining the alliance, hosting two exercises.76  
By bringing the Czech Republic into the alliance, one of the positives was the 
ability to have access to Czech airspace and facilities in order to provide security for 
NATOs eastern territorial frontier.  However, the condition of Czech facilities and 
military infrastructure is not up to standards.  Before the country's acceptance into 
NATO, it completed 14 out of 52 target force goals that it intended to fulfill for NATO, 
most aimed at improving the interoperability of communications equipment, strengthen 
procedures, and increasing the country's ability to host allied troops and equipment. The 
Czechs have received positive marks from NATO experts in working on issues of 
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). They have 
integrated into the NATO air-defense system and are beginning to equip planes with IFF 
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equipment.  Czech airfields, however, are not able to accept reinforcements from NATO 
armies because the runways are not long enough and fuel stores are inadequate.77 
It has been the complaint of anti-NATO expansion groups that NATO member 
countries will invest a total of $1.9-billion (5.4 billion crowns) into military infrastructure 
projects in the Czech Republic, making Czech enlargement less than cost effective.  
Based on the estimates of the Congressional Budget Office, these cost estimates seem 
greatly exaggerated.  Most of these projects relate to the defense of airspace and include 
communications and information systems, the improvement of two airports, and most of 
two NATO air space protection radars.  NATO will also foot the bill for the Czech 
connection to the joint anti-aircraft protection system, called NATINEADS, for central 
Europe.78  There is little doubt that NATO is accepting a substantial expense to upgrade 
Czech defense facilities.  
 
H. MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS  
Like many of the former Warsaw Pact nations, attempting to get a portion of the 
limited funding for military reform to comply with NATO standards against other 
competing interests has proved problematic for the Czech military.  Alliance membership 
has placed a significant economic burden on new members.  The Czech Republic is no 
exception.  Since 1997, NATO leaders have repeatedly castigated the Czechs for the 
relatively modest sums they have spent on defense in spite of their pledges to reform their 
militaries in accordance with NATO criteria.  NATO has asked that at least 2.0-percent of 
GDP be designated to defense by each country joining NATO in 1999.  While the Czechs  
have raised their percentage of spending since the late 1990s, the Czech Republic as well 
as Hungary have both had difficulty meeting this request consistently. 79 
As previously mentioned, the budgetary figure of 2.2 percent of GDP was 
approved as policy within the Military Strategy of the Czech Republic in April of 2002, 
and the Czechs made commitments to NATO in November of 2002 at the Prague 
Conference based on that budget.  However, in response to mounting deficits of public 
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finance, the Czech parliament  has already reneged on its promise for military 
appropriations.  During the summer of 2003, the parliament reduced the planned annual 
2.2 percent of GDP appropriated to the military down to 1.9-percent of GDP.80  This is 
less than the 2.0 percent figure NATO is requesting of its newest members.81  In protest, 
Czech Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdil resigned this summer warning that the country’s 
attempt to professionalize its army, specialize the military, and boost its defense 
capabilities could not be accomplished within the constraints of the reduced budget.  He 
claimed that the planned Czech reforms could end “in ruins”.  Tvrdil has been quoted as 
saying that “…reform is at a critical phase…at which point we will lose all our money 
and have to start again.”82    
Interestingly, one major reason cited for the cuts to the Czech military is to cut 
their deficit, which is currently running near 5.0-percent (5.7 percent in 2001) of GDP, to 
around 4.0-percent of GDP by 2006.  The goal of the country is to eventually reduce the 
deficit to under the maximum deficit standard the European Union (EU) allows so that 
the Czech’s can qualify to utilize the EU’s common currency standard.  The Czech 
central bank would like the euro to replace the Czech crown in 2007.  However, the 
deficit cannot exceed 3-percent for the Czech Republic to qualify.  The Czech 
government is hoping to join the euro-zone in 2009.83 
While many are again questioning the Czechs commitment to NATO with the 
recent budget action, in fairness to the Czech government, they have had to confront 
some unforeseen budgetary pressures and many competing interests.  Specifically, the 
central European floods in the summer of 2002 devastated the Czech infrastructure 
around Prague and beyond.  Additionally, the economy has not recovered as quickly as 
expected from the worldwide recession.   
Faced with the budget cuts, the military Chief of Staff, Pavel Stefka, has 
announced plans to reduce individual sectors of the armed forces rather than perform 
across the board cuts, which would downgrade all of his units.  Stefka hopes that the 
Czech military will be able to support most of their commitments to collective defense 
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and “…others [in the alliance] can complement the sectors we lack.” 84  The current 
cutbacks are aimed to reduce the forces from the planned number of 45,000, including 
10,000 civilians outlined in the 2002 strategic plan, to just 30,000 including 7,000 
civilians.  The number of bases will likely be cut from a projected end state of 77 to a 
maximum of 66.  Cuts will extend to antiaircraft units, Mi-17 and Mi-24 Helicopters, and 
the Czech built L-159 light combat planes will be reduced in number from a planned 
purchase of 72 to just 18.   They had previously abandoned plans to purchase twenty-four 
JAS-39 Gripen supersonic fighters.  The number of tanks earmarked for modernization 
will drop from approximately 250 to just 30.  The only winners will be the Special Forces 
whose numbers will grow under current proposals.  Currently, the military is plagued by 
a host of morale problems due to uncertainty created by the budget cuts.85  While Czech 
politicians claim that almost all of the alliance commitments made at the November 2002 
Prague Conference will be kept, they have sent a letter of warning to NATO that they 
will need to discuss the commitments they made again. 86   
 
I. PUBLIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT   
Considering the tremendous institutional shift that was required after the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Czech Republic must be 
applauded for developing what appears to be a stable democracy and a working market 
economy in less than a decade, based on all indicators.  This would seem to have been 
more difficult to achieve in the Czech Republic because a communist orthodoxy of 
control persisted over the country after the crushing of the “Prague Spring” in 1968, 
giving the Czechoslovaks nothing of a democratic warm-up period. 87  As such, there was 
no period of liberalization of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia prior to 
independence in 1989 like there was in Poland and Hungary.  Nevertheless, all evidence 
shows that Czech Democracy and a market economy developed fairly rapidly.  The 
Czech “Freedom House” scores are both excellent, listed as a “1” on the Human Rights 
                                                 
84 Zapletnyuk , “Czech Military reforms Could End in Ruins,” Transitions Online, June 6, 2003.   
85 Magnus Bennett, “Czech Army Faces Budget Crunch.”  Prague Post Online, July 24, 2003, 
http://www.ocnus.net/artman/publish/article-6285.shtml, accessed September 12, 2003. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Gazdik and Grohova “NATO Membership Transforms Czech Military, Boosts National Confidence.”   
33 
scale and a “2” on the Civil Liberties scale consistently from 1994 through 2000.88  The 
Czech Republic does appear to have an above average amount of corruption against its 
central European counterparts with a rating of 3.7 on the corruption perception index in 
2002, based on surveys conducted by Transparency International. 89  The Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth has been running right at 2.9 percent through 2003 and is 
projected to grow and be around 3.6-percent through 2004.  The Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) is projected to increase by only .6 percent in 2003 and 1.2 percent in 2004.  The 
inflation rate was a very manageable 4.7% in 2001, 1.8% in 2002 and is projected to be at 
1.3% in 2003.  The Czechs have had a slightly high but falling unemployment rate of 
8.6% in 2001, with a rate of 7.6% in 2002 and a projected rate of 7.1% in 2003.  90  While 
it will take many years for the Czechs to establish an economy as large as the more 
established democracies in Europe, overall, current economic indicators are mostly 
positive. 
In spite of the development of Czech democracy as well as a functioning market 
economy, the Czech military and its integration into NATO has received inconsistent 
support from the government and the public.  While there are budgetary challenges that 
are holding back the reform of the Czech military, the underlying problem is rooted in the 
public’s perception, the priority they give their military, and their role in NATO.  
Historically, the Czech public perception of NATO membership was not given an 
opportunity to evolve.  Prior to accession to the alliance in 1999, polls showed that the 
Czech public support for membership was among the lowest of the ten countries aspiring 
to membership. Polling conducted in 1997 showed that only 55-percent to 61-percent of 
Czechs supported entry to NATO.  Instead of educating the public, Czech officials and 
politicians prepared, initiated, and implement the entire NATO accession process with 
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little public debate.91  As such, the Czech public has had a low level of knowledge 
regarding the responsibilities that came with membership.  This was no accident.  
Because it was widely believed that the public had a negative impression of the military 
within the Czech Republic, politicians deliberately kept the NATO membership debate at 
a low profile so as not to irritate the public.  The goal of politicians from all parties was, 
not to overcome the low level of public support by discussing the merits of NATO 
membership, but rather to join NATO by avoiding public scrutiny.  As such, there was no 
public referendum in the Czech Republic as there was elsewhere regarding NATO 
membership.92 
Another problem was that the Czech Republic lacked the experts who could articulate 
a detailed understanding of the inter-workings and requirements of the NATO alliance.  
Whatever understanding did exist remained limited to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
and Defense.  These people had no reason or a mechanism for making NATO 
membership a subject of wider public discussion. 93   
But a deeper reason for the lack of resources offered to the military may be the 
lack of interest among the Czech public and politicians toward issues of defense and 
security.  According to polling conducted in 2000 and 2001 by Ivan Gabal, Lenka 
Helsusovam and Thomas Szayna regarding the Czech perception about NATO 
membership, 87-percent of the Czech people do not feel that the Czech Republic is 
externally threatened in any way. 94  Most Czechs see their NATO membership in terms 
of a tilt towards the West rather than a commitment to a new security alliance.  Many see 
their NATO membership as a stepping-stone for the country’s preparation to join the 
EU.95  These public responses have led to questions regarding the Czech commitment to 
the alliance, both in and out of government, and have lead to allegations that the Czechs 
are “easy riders” or “free riders”.96   While polling does not support these allegations, 
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there are persistence questions in the minds of Czechs regarding what the alliance 
commitment is all about.  An “us against them cold war mentality” still persists in some 
of the less educated parts of the population. 97  However, polling consistently shows that 
the majorities want the country to live up to its alliance commitments.98   The problem 
comes in terms of priorities, because few feel any external threat to the Czech Republic, 
so it is difficult for politicians to justify allocating resources to the military against the 
many other competing interests important to the government.  
  
J. CONCLUSION 
The difficulties of the Czech Republic’s integration into NATO are rooted in the 
history of the relationship between the public and the military dating back to the Austro-
Hungarian period.  The military was not a significant factor, nor were they held in high 
esteem in the Czechoslovak nation fo r decades.  The good news is that improvements are 
taking place in the public perception of their role in NATO.  Efforts in the Balkans have 
helped the esteem and public perception of the armed forces, as well as providing a 
demonstration of competence and importance.  A lesson to be transferred to the new 
round of NATO members appears to be that integration into NATO can have positive 
effects on the esteem, perception, and importance of the armed forces. 
Achieving transformation is difficult in any military.  While the Czech military 
has had transformation difficulties, most of these difficulties need to be classified as 
typical for former Warsaw Pact nations because they relate to overcoming their cold war 
mentality and force structure.  In most former communist states, it has taken longer than 
expected for transformation to occur.  The Czechs did not get a head start at reforms 
compared to others like the Polish and the Hungarians because significant repression 
existed in Czech society through 1989. 
While it is somewhat understandable that the Czechs are having trouble 
formulating a consistent defense policy in view of the short amount of time they have 
been at it, the Czech government is consistently having problems supporting what they 
previously agreed to support.  While the Czechs now have a very good idea of what they 
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want to accomplish and why, they are far from filling in the details and are having trouble 
following through with funding the military transformation.  Issues like the development 
of a professional army, an NCO corps, the development of a training infrastructure and 
curriculum, human resource marketing models, promotion criteria, and the many other 
aspects of building a new infrastructure are just now being developed.   The manner in 
which they are preceding is appropriate as outlined by the recent review conducted by 
General Schroeder.  However, Schroeder sees correctly that the historical problem has 
been funding and following through – not the plan itself.  Nevertheless, Schroeder does 
not let the military off the hook.  He subtly notes that the military cannot just blame 
civilians.  The military has the responsibility to market itself in Czech society, making its 
own importance and contributions known.  It is up to the Defense Ministry to make its 
own case for the appropriate portion of the national assets, in addition to spending those 
assets appropriately.   
Morale problems are typical of any large bureaucracy that is reducing its 
workforce.  The Czech Army is no exception.   While there is nothing published 
regarding how well the Czechs are managing their military drawdown process compared 
to others, morale has reportedly been low in the Czech army since the early 1990s.  In 
any bureaucracy with a limited budget where a drawdown is taking place more quickly 
than on an attritional basis, the reduction process will be painful.  It is difficult to believe 
that morale will improve much before the process is complete.  Again, problems 
associated with the reductions in the size of the Czech army are found in many NATO 
countries since the Cold War, including the United States. 
Problems with the Military Intelligence Services of former Warsaw Pact nations, 
including Romania and elsewhere, are not new.  The recent problems reported in the 
Czech Republic’s Defense Intelligence Service are surprising, only because they did not 
get greater attention at an earlier time period.  The fact that the Czechs have decided to 
disband defense intelligence and start over reflects that they feel that little can be 
salvaged from their current system.   
The Czech insistence to bear the expense to protect their own airspace, in view of 
the general reluctance to spend on their military in general, remains an interesting one.  
Although NATO authorities have tried to convince the Czechs that the airspace could be 
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secured by other alliance members at a more economical rate, Czech leaders have 
apparently decided that there is a limit to trusting their security to the alliance.  This is 
counter to the Czech desire to take part in the European Common Market and accept the 
European Common Currency – steps that might seem to some as a greater sovereignty 
divestment.  This decision does provide an indicator of the strong persistence of a Czech 
national identity and is certainly consistent with the rest of central Europe. 
Probably the most important lesson that can be taken from the Czech experience 
is in the area of civil-military relations.  The public was uninvolved and disinterested in 
the decision to seek membership in NATO, nor did politicians make an effort to involve 
them.  Ironically, most of the problems that the Czech Military has confronted have been 
rooted in a lack of public interest, understanding and support.  Ultimately, it is the 
taxpayers in the candidate countries that need to make good on the commitments that 
accession to NATO represents.  As in the Czech case, when taxpayers are neither 
consulted on their views on accession, nor informed properly about the costs of alliance 
integration, both the quality of the accessants membership is damaged and NATO has to 
deal with security shortcomings that are potentially damaging to its operations.99  The 
Czech Republic clearly demonstrates why public perceptions are an important matter to 
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III.  INTEGRATION OF HUNGARY INTO NATO 
How has NATO profited by adding Hungary to the alliance?  On the positive side, 
NATO has one of the leaders of postcommunist democratization and economic transition 
in central Europe.100  Hungary has already proven its geographical worth by acting as a 
staging area for both the SFOR and KFOR operations in the Balkans since 1996.  
However, on the negative side, the Hungarian Defense Force (HDF) remains in a beaten 
and pathetic state.  Post-Communist Hungary inherited a military establishment that had 
been prepared and outfitted as part of the Warsaw Pact’s offensive doctrine.  The HDF 
has remained greatly under funded and inadequately equipped.  Pay in the armed forces is 
inadequate, and moral has been horrible for decades.  The prestige of the military 
profession in Hungary has been among the lowest in the region.  Since at least 1948 when 
Hungary came under Soviet influence, the army has been held in low esteem, and the 
financial outlays necessary to change things drastically have not won support.101  
On the political front, a senior figure in European security recently remarked that 
“Hungary has won the prize for the most disappointing new member of NATO,” citing 
allegations of anti-Semitism, extraterritorial claims against neighbors, a reactionary view 
of military reform, and a failure to play a constructive role in Balkan security. 102  Any 
understanding of these comments lay in understanding the bitter hand that Hungarians 
feel history has dealt them.  It and reminds them that the Hungarian armed forces, 
hampered by a vulnerable geography, have almost never been successful on the field of 
battle.  Following the Austro-Hungarian collapse in the wake of defeat after the First 
World War, the new government was forced to sign the Trianon Peace Treaty in 1920, 
effectively divesting the country of 70-percent of its former land, one-third if its 
population, and all of its raw materials.  Although not Fascist, the Hungarian government 
initially sided with Hitler during the Second World War in hopes of regaining lost 
territory.  This endeavor ultimately failed entirely and Hungarian territory became a 
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battleground for offenses against the Nazis.103  Some have accused the conservative 
government of Prime Minster Victor Orbán of having nationalist leanings and igniting 
underlying Hungarian bitterness.  However, it is hoped that the reignition of these 
feelings has been laid dormant with the recent defeat of the Orbán government in 2002. 
In the introduction to the new Defense Review, published August 11, 2003, 
Defense Minister Ferenc Juhász is brutally frank about the current state of the Hungarian 
military.  Juhász states, “The constant reforms and reorganizations of the HDF of the past 
twenty years have caused a downward spiral of serial failures by the armed forces…”. 104  
He also stated that Hungary is so far from meeting its commitments to NATO that it 
“…would have been expelled if there were a mechanism for expulsion in place.”105  He 
notes that the HDF has had a difficult time finding their place in society and in making a 
meaningful contribution to the alliance.  He bluntly claims that the armed forces have not 
made good use of the hundreds of billions of taxpayer’s money they have received.  He 
indicates that this is because of short sightedness that has caused the military to continue 
to prepare for a 20th century war -- a war that will never be fought in the 21st century.  
Juhász notes that Hungary continues to believe that its future stability and security will 
best be guaranteed through membership in NATO, which it joined in 1999, and the EU, 
which it intends to join in 2004.  However, it appears that once NATO membership was 
achieved, reform stagnated.106   
 
A. PUBLIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT 
First articulated in a 1990 speech by then foreign minister Gyula Horn, Hungary 
was the first former Warsaw Pact nation to speculate about the plausibility to become a 
                                                 
103 Janos Szabó, “ Transforming the Defense Sector in a New Democracy - Hungary,” Military and Society in 
21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis, Jürgen Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan, Eds., George C. Marshall 
European Center (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 115.  
104 Introduction by Ferenc Juhász, Minister of Defense, to “Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century,” 
Hungarian Defense Mirror, Honvedelmi Miniszterium, August 11, 2003, 4. Internet Site 
http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php=13869, accessed September 25, 2003.   
105 Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies , 28. 
106 “Defense, Executive Summary: Hungary,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments – The Balkans, Jane’s, 
February 11, 2003, internet site 
http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/balksu/hungs010.htm@current&QueryText=n
ull&Prod_Name=BALKSU&image=browse&#section3, accessed September 27, 2003. 
41 
member of NATO.107  Afterwards, the campaign for NATO membership was decidedly 
elite-driven and has been supported by all the major political parties.  The campaign paid 
off.  In November of 1997, 85-percent of Hungarians voted in a referendum in favor of 
membership in NATO.108 
In spite of the recognition in Hungary of the value of security the NATO 
referendum demonstrates, the military has not quickly lost its negative legacy because of 
it.  However, there is some polling evidence that would seem to indicate that the 
traditional public view of the military is slowly changing with NATO membership and 
that the public has been receptive to recent defense reforms.  A Gallup poll conducted in 
February of 2000 reported that 61-percent of the public was supportive of greater 
spending for military reform, although not if it would mean raising taxes.  81-percent 
were supportive of the reexamination of strategy in hopes of more effective armed forces. 
A Gallup poll conducted the previous November suggested that the armed forces had 
restored their public image.  The armed forces ranked fourth on a list of institutions that 
had the public confidence followed by the president, the border patrol, and the 
Constitutional Court (see Table 1).  They also ranked number four out of Hungarian 
institutions to which the public was willing to give their tax money. 109  But while trust in 
the military has risen, confidence has not.  From September of 1991 to September of 
2000, the public’s confidence in the military dropped from 66-percent to 42-percent.110  
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Table 1.  The Change in Public Confidence in Institutions 111    
From Median Public Opinion and Marketing Co. Ltd. 
[averages on a scale of 100; 1 = no confidence at all; 100 = full confidence] 
 Sep-91 Jan-92 Oct-93 Jul-94 Apr-96 Nov-98 Oct-99 Sep-00 
President of the Rep. 79 - 61 80 70 72 74 68 
Constitutional Court 68 - 50 65 65 71 67 67 
Courts 73 53 49 59 50 54 53 53 
Armed Forces 66 52 53 62 55 55 51 42 
Churches 61 56 - - 45 43 47 42 
Police 64 - 51 59 54 61 41 45 
Local Government 61 53 47 56 52 54 56 54 
Government 57 43 29 63 42 50 42 42 
Parliament 57 33 30 58 38 48 42 43 
Trade Unions 39 - 33 39 30 31 27 28 
Parties 37 - 26 43 31 38 36 35 
 Source: J. Eszényi, A honvédség iránti lakossági bizalom tíz éve /Ten years of public 
confidence towards the Home Defense Forces/ , Új Honvédség Szemle, no. 5 (2001) 29. 
 
 
In spite of the public’s warming trust in the military, there is very little interest in 
defense matters.  As in most of Europe, this is probably because the public sees no 
imminent military threats to Hungarian territory in the foreseeable future.  General threat 
perceptions have changed in two ways.  First, threats perceived by the public are moving 
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away from military ones to an increasing emphasis on problems such as organized crime 
and illegal migration.  Second, the conclusion of the Yugoslav wars and the demise of 
Milosevic in 2000 removed what was seen as the main military threat to Hungarian 
security. 112  As a result, there are no known security threats and the idea of collective 
security may seem to be a bit nebulous to the public. 
In addition to the lack of public interest in national defense, the lack of an obvious 
external threat is allowing politicians to play politics with the military.  There are great 
differences between the political parties regarding the method and timing of defense 
reform, being driven primarily for the purpose of political posturing.  There remains the 
danger that the political establishment will continue to use the defense sector as a 
playground for experimentation and rhetorical gain, thinking that there are no political 
costs for doing so.113    
Interestingly, the lack of interest in defense issues does not appear to be due to 
weak institutions or an especially poor economy by Central European standards.  
Considering the tremendous institutional shift that was required after the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary has had few bumps in developing 
what appears to be a stable democracy and a working market economy in less than a 
decade.  Like the Czech Republic, Hungary’s  “Freedom House” scores are both 
excellent, listed as a “1” on the Human Rights scale and a “2” on the Civil Liberties scale 
consistently from 1993 through 2000.114  Hungary does appear to have less corruption 
than either Poland or the Czech Republic in addition to most other former Warsaw Pact 
countries with a rating of 4.9 on the corruption perception index in 2002, based on 
surveys conducted by Transparency International.115  The Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth has been running right at 3.2 percent through 2003 and is projected to 
grow and be around 4.4 percent through 2004.  The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is 
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projected to increase a moderate 4.7 percent in 2003 and 4.4 percent in 2004. 
Unemployment has been running at 6.2 percent, which is well below average by Central 
European standards.116   
Meeting NATO’s criteria of achieving democracy and a market economy was 
perhaps easier for Hungary compared to other former Warsaw Pact states because they 
had the great fortune of having a significant “post-totalitarian” warm up period.  As such, 
its transition to Western style parliamentary democracy was the first and the smoothest 
among the former Soviet bloc nations, inspired by ingrained nationalism that encouraged 
Hungarians to control their own destiny.117  Although Hungary had no social movements 
comparable to Solidarity in Poland or street demonstrations of the magnitude found in 
Czechoslovakia, an enlightened leadership softened the Soviet political constraints to the 
extent possible immediately after the attempted 1956 revolution.  By 1987, a large 
number of self-organized associational groups emerged in Hungarian society, showing 
that Hungarians could tolerate a significant amount of diversity by Warsaw Pact 
standards.118  The Soviet Economic constraints were liberalized to the extent possible as 
well.  This was led by the “New Economic Mechanism,” started in 1968, that represented 
the most pervasive experimentation of any Warsaw Pact country with markets and quasi-
private property.  It initially reopened Hungary to foreign trade, gave limited freedom to 
the market, and allowed a number of small businesses to operate in the service sector.119  
As evidence of this, 55-percent of all new housing in Hungary was constructed by this 
“secondary” economy and was open to private purchase and ownership.120  This carried 
through the end of the communist regime and made the transition to democracy and a 
market economy much easier by 1989.   
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B. OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATION 
As mentioned, Hungarian’s do not historically have a positive military heritage 
and Hungarian society has not traditionally held its armed forces in high esteem.  The 
military has too often been seen as the evil arm of authoritarian regimes, including both 
fascist regimes in World War II and communist regimes through the 1980s.  The 
Hungarians have too often historically found themselves on the wrong side of a losing 
cause.  The army is reputed by some to have lost every war from 1487 through the 
communist era ending in 1989.  It was last charged to defend the nation against the 
overwhelming Soviet invasion in 1956, which, of course, it could not do.121  It is these 
memories that underlie the problems Hungary is having in meeting its commitments to 
NATO.   
Unlike Poland, Hungary has a history of civilian control of the military.  While 
this characteristic is often described as a positive in other places, in Hungary, it is 
sometimes seen as a negative because of the degree of dominance civilians have 
maintained over the military.  Far from any concern the military might meddle in politics, 
the long history of civilian dominance has been a detriment to military effectiveness.122  
Too often throughout the 1990s, politicians made political decisions regarding the 
military without consultation as to the ramifications with military experts.123  This 
politicization of defense issues has caused constant course reversals, such as which air 
bases to keep open, whether to refurbish MiG-29s, and whether to lease Gripen 
fighters.124  The fact that Hungary is the only country within NATO that requires a two-
thirds majority in parliament to send its troops abroad has also caused some concerns.  
For example, Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi and others have called for Hungary to 
have a new national security strategy, which would allow the cabinet to act on its own in 
emergency situations.125 
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 Following their formal accession to NATO, many members of the Hungarian 
government remain worried that the restructure of the country's military has failed to 
progress at the desired speed due to the pursuit of the wrong priorities.  The Hungarian 
cabinet, responding to allegations that soldier’s living standards have reached a critical 
low, now accept the fact that the past military reorganization attempts have failed in 
many respects.   Certainly, U.S. General Joseph Ralston, the head of EUCOM, and 
Secretary-General Lord George Robertson, have both echoed this concern. 126  While 
pursing the wrong priorities is a factor, a lack of military appropriations appears to be the 
major culprit cited for these shortcomings.  For both reasons, progress has been 
extremely slow.  Accordingly, the government has now stipulated a new, more realistic, 
10-year deadline for Hungarian forces to come up to NATO standards.127  
While it appears tha t conscription will be phased out at some point, training 
continues for conscripts and newly recruited contract soldiers.  Unfortunately, training 
takes place against a background of an increasing number of resignations of regular 
officers and NCOs because of low pay, poor housing and declining social status.  As a 
result, the quality of training suffers.  Continuity and expertise in the armed forces 
continues to be a problem. 128  
While it has now been more than twelve years since the end of the demise of the  
Warsaw Pact, structural and doctrinal differences with NATO remain.129   A major 
problem lies in the national defense planning process.  It is still not fully interoperable 
with the process used by NATO, meaning that Hungary must continue to maintain two 
parallel processes.  Defense planning lacks sufficient depth or detail.  For instance, in the 
defense transformation and downsizing, cuts were made without careful consideration 
regarding the impact of these cuts, sometimes rendering units entirely ineffective.  As is 
an inherent problem with downsizing militaries, staffs at central headquarters were often 
protected and, in some cases, actually increased in order to protect some of those whose 
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jobs were being eliminated in the field.130  As in the Czech Republic and elsewhere, 
constant downsizing is often difficult for those in the military to accept.   
Another defense planning problem is the way plans are budgeted by the 
parliament.  The execution of long-range plans cannot be assured because the funding of 
plans is handled from year to year.  As a result, the Ministry of Defense may start a costly 
program but may need to greatly cut the original concept due to funding shortfalls and 
may not finish the program at all.131   
As in the Czech Republic, there has been significant debate between the 
Hungarians and NATO planners as to whether Hungary needs to control its own airspace.  
The issue became controversial during the mid-1990s when aircraft from the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia violated Hungarian airspace.  During the Kosovo crisis in the late 
1990s, there was public discontent over the need for aircraft from other nations to patrol 
Hungarian airspace.  NATO planners have told the Hungarian government that the 
alliance air-defense umbrella makes the acquisition of supersonic fighters unnecessary.  
They suggest that the limited funds would be better spent on more basic acquisitions, 
upgrades and reforms.  However, the country's history leaves its electorate and political 
class broadly convinced that the country's air force must be able to mount a robust 
defense of its sovereign airspace.  The national defense continues to direct that the air 
defense and air force units will possess the facilities and power necessary to control and 
defend the country's airspace, to protect the major installations, and to provide the aerial 
support required by defensive activities.132 
In spite of Hungary’s insistence that they will control their own airspace, pilot 
training has been a constant problem.  Hungarian pilots fly only an average of between 50 
to 75 hours per year due to funding.  By comparison, American pilots consider 100 hours 
flying time a year as a dangerously low amount to maintain proficiency.  In spite of this, 
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except for the thirty Hungarian MiG-29 pilots assigned to NATO, this situation appears 
likely to persist for most pilots for the foreseeable future.133    
Since NATO membership became a reality, the Hungarians have had to 
constantly reassess and scale back their target goals, primarily because of a lack of 
funding.  Prior to being accepted into the alliance, the Hungarian’s had promised to meet 
14 of its 48 target goals towards their acceptance into the alliance.  By the time 
membership was achieved in 1999, only six of these goals were met and the Hungarians 
were still working on the others.  By the end of 2003, it is estimated that Hungary will 
only meet 23 of these goals.134  Hungary has continued to struggle with routine NATO 
integration challenges.  For example, English sufficiency, one of the two languages used 
by NATO, has been a shortcoming. Also, the development of secure telecommunications, 
computer, and data systems has been a problem.  While these problems are slowly being 
addressed, they still exist.135 
Underlying all of the challenges of Hungary’s integration into NATO is its 
military budget.  In spite of military commanders repeatedly announcing that it would be 
impossible to maintain the country’s defenses with the meager resources allocated to 
them, defense budgets shrank from 3.5-percent of GDP in 1988 to a low of 1.4 in 1998.  
There has been only a little improvement since.  In view of a lack of public concern about 
defense issues and the fact that the Hungarian’s have lacked an effective defense lobby, 
reducing defense budgets has been good politics.  While military budgets have improved 
modestly, the Hungarian Defense Force (HDF) remains totally impoverished.136   
 
C. MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS  
Even before it became an alliance member, NATO has consistently criticized 
Budapest for its low level of military expenditure and its failure to fulfill pledges 
involving spending increases.  As mentioned, during the late 1990s, Hungary’s military 
spending dipped as low as 1.4-percent of GDP in 1998 – not nearly enough to facilitate 
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the military transformation needed to achieve NATO integration. 137  In 1999, spending 
was raised to only 1.6-percent of GDP during the time it was attempting to gain NATO 
membership.138  In real terms, from 1996 through the year 2000, annual defense spending 
fluctuated between $660-million (U.S.) to $698-million (U.S.) - a reflection of just how 
small the GDP is in postcommunist countries compared to established European 
democracies.  When Hungary acceded to NATO in 1999, through negotiation, it took on 
a firm commitment to increase its defense spending one percent each year to reach the 
level of 1.81-percent of its GDP.  While this was under the 2.0-percent of GDP NATO 
was requesting from its other new entrants, Hungary immediately fell behind this lower 
pledge amount. The actual amount spent was reduced in 2000 to only 1.51-percent.139  
Since then, Hungary has continued to under perform its military appropriations goals.  
For instance, in 2002, defense spending only reached the level of 1.6-percent of GDP.  
Defense Minister Ferenc Juhász recently announced that the government has now 
promised to increase defense spending to the level of 2.0-pecent of GDP by 2006.140  
However, based on past performance, it would be difficult to rely on Hungary’s pledge to 
meet this goal. 
Making Hungary’s promise even more difficult for the alliance, the fiscal 
approach that dominated NATO’s first eastward enlargement was flawed.  It did not 
identify capability improvement projects at an early stage, and as a consequence, the 
defense budget could increase without actually making improvements to the performance 
of the Hungarian armed forces.141  This was arguably happening in Hungary where most 
of the funds continued to flow into supersonic aircraft and military salaries due to 
Hungary’s insistence to control its own airspace as well as outdated units and personnel 
structures.  Spending in this fashion had little to do with supporting NATO requirements.   
Arguably, Hungary’s recent low percentage of defense spending is not because 
the economy is weaker than other economies in Central Europe.  In fact, Hungary's 
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economy is better prepared than most for EU membership.  It has strong growth rates of 
5.15-percent in 2000 and 3.8-percent in 2001, as well as unemployment at a reasonable 
level of around 6.0-percent of the labor force.  Foreign direct investment is also high, 
reaching $2.1-billion (U.S.) in 2001.142  The Governor of the Hungarian National Bank 
deemed the country's economy strong enough for all restrictions to be lifted from the 
Hungarian forint (HUF). By June 2001, the HUF had become fully convertible. The 
move was in line with Hungary's intention to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
membership in 2006.  However, like the Czech Republic, they are being held back due to 
a continuing large public budget deficit of 9.9-percent of GDP in 2002.  While the deficit 
is improving, Hungary does have a long way to go in order to enter the EMU on 
schedule.  Like the Czechs, the existence of the deficit along with the desire to join the 
EMU will likely continue to cause politicians to avoid providing the full allotment of 
spending promised to the military. 143 
 
 
D. PLANS FOR REFORM 
The most recent Hungarian Defense Review was initiated in 2002 and was 
published August 11, 2003.  The objective of the review was to:  
…redefine the function and tasks of the Hungarian Defense Forces in 
compliance with the significant changed international situation and NATO 
concepts as well as the national interests and goals, identify and prioritize 
the necessary capabilities and make proposals to allocate resources to such 
capabilities.144  
 It reflects the fact that the Hungarian’s feel they now face no foreseeable strategic 
or territorial threats other than terrorism.  Beyond territorial security, Hungary’s entire 
plan is centered on integration with the current NATO strategic plans.  Officials 
acknowledge that their past promises to NATO were not realistic and therefore not 
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carried out.  They also recognize that “Maintaining the present structure of 
…[Hungarian] defense forces is impossible…” as well as pointless, even if financial 
sources were increased.145  In order to pay for the changes that are necessary, the 
reduction of the armed forces is a key element to the success of the reorganization 
program. To date, forces have been cut by more than 200-percent since 1989 and the 
reductions are continuing.146  However, closing outdated barracks and renovating 
facilities that will not continue to be used is also an important part of the plan. 147  
Unfortunately, because of funding deficiencies, barracks renovation and quality of life 
improvements have been slow. 
In his introduction to the 2003 Defense Review, Defense Minister Ferenc Juhász 
acknowledges a greatly changing security environment since the last review that was 
conducted in the 1999-2000 time frame.  The review not only includes post September 
11th considerations, but also integrates the “Prague Capability Commitments” Hungary 
made at the recent Prague conference in November 2002.  However, unlike previous 
reviews, this one claims to have been completed more carefully and is more in line with 
projected defense budgets.  New initiatives include the introduction of modern protective 
equipment against chemical and biological weapons, integration into the development of 
the alliance surveillance system, the development of transportation capabilities, and 
modernization of the Hungarian logistics capability.   Recent NATO experience is 
showing that Special Forces are playing a greater role.  This realization is built into the 
Defense Review as well.148  
As it considered its recent Defense Review, Hungary has had to face the fact that 
few but the largest states are able to secure funding to maintain the spectrum of 
capabilities typical of the Cold War.  Because if this, Hungary is participating in the 
shared task specialization with other European NATO members.  In view of their funding 
level, maintaining a stand-alone modern military capability is no longer an option for 
most member states.149 
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Much of the redesign of the Hungarian armed forces is aimed at the current 
alliance terrorist threat.  In the wake of the September 11th attacks in the United States, 
the Hungarian parliament responded to United States requests and approved national anti-
terrorism legislation authorizing the imposition of an embargo on any state, organization, 
or individual suspected of terrorism.150  Hungary has been on an increased state of alert 
since the terrorist attacks in the United States. Amongst other measures, the National 
Security Cabinet has sanctioned increased protection for the Paks nuclear power plant in 
Hungary, and preparations are underway to develop the capability to counter biological 
attacks. The Hungarian parliament overwhelmingly approved a resolution for increased 
internal and external security measures, with some $68-million (U.S.) having already 
been set aside.  
Another core task outlined in the Defense Review is the need to perform 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in concert with other forces around the 
world, both as part of NATO and in other scenarios.  In this regard, the Hungarian’s are 
proposing that they specialize in engineering functions including bridge building and 
water supply as well as military policing.   The Hungarian army has recently shown its 
expertise in bridge building functions during SFOR. 151 
In meeting the current challenge efficiently, the Hungarians realize that they require 
flexible armed forces that can be used within the entire spectrum of national and allied 
tasks, from warfighting to peacekeeping.  This flexibility is the only cost effective way to 
achieve the goals they desire.  As such, each element of their military must be able to 
perform various functions.  Additionally, Hungary realizes that it needs light, mobile and 
deployable land forces to take part in Article 6 “out-of-area” missions as they are 
required.  Developing strategic transportation capabilities and a solid combat support 
capacity are pre-requisites to deploying forces on a regular basis.  Additionally, Hungary 
needs to gradually enter into service up-to-date military technical equipment to achieve a 
higher level of interoperability with others in the Alliance.  This means a modern, mobile 
and secure command, communications and information capability.  
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Another theme of the Defense Review is the fact that the need for armored 
capabilities, a component of the Warsaw Pact force structure, is greatly decreasing 
because the threat of a ground attack has become almost nil.  This includes fixed, non-
deployable command elements.  This equipment is not interoperable and is entirely 
outdated.  Though Hungarians have been reluctant to part with this equipment, they now 
see that maintaining it requires scarce financial and human resources with little positive 
gain in terms of a modern defense capability.  Instead, all efforts are being put into 
collective defense for any residual ground attack threat.  
Hungary’s emphasis on integration training with other Western militaries seems 
to be paying off.  Prior to joining NATO, between 1990 and 1996, more than 800 
Hungarian Army personnel were sent to NATO nations for training.  This number has 
accelerated since.   The US, France, Germany and the UK are continuing to give 
technical training in numerous areas related to alliance integration by way of visiting 
teams and offering places in their own national military education programs.152  The 
results of working with more advanced militaries seem to be paying off in terms of 
Hungary’s military expertise. 
 
E. FORCE RESTRUCTURING  
Like all the Defense Forces of the former Warsaw Pact as well as most of the 
more mature NATO members, the Hungarians have long been greatly reducing their 
overall force structure.  At its height in 1989, the HDF boosted 155,700 men. 153  
Constant downsizing has reduced that number to 45,000 members, including civilians, in 
2002.  By 2006, the overall number of forces is expected to total of 35,000, including 
5000 civilians.  By 2013, the total forces are projected to be 30,000 including only 3,500 
civilians.154  To meet these numbers, many previous functions provided by the military 
will need to be outsourced to the private sector. The downsizing process is projected to 
continue until at least 2013 when the entire Hungarian military will be reduced to around 
30,000 including civilians (see Table 2).  
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Table 2.  Expected Phases of Downsizing (From155) 
 
By 2006 HDF 30 thousand, 
MoD and background 
institutes 5 thousand 
(Total 35 thousand) 
By 2010 HDF 28 thousand, 
MoD and background 
institutes 4 thousand 
(Total 32 thousand) 
By 2013 HDF 26.5 thousand, 
MoD and background 
institutes 3.5 




Along with the downsizing effort, major alterations in the force structure are 
necessary.  The recent Defense Review highlights the need for better trained, better 
motivated, more experienced soldiers in order to meet current NATO tasking.  First, like 
all of the former Warsaw Pact countries, the Hungarian’s are still trying to solve their 
“reverse pyramid” problem in their leadership ranks.  This means that they continue to 
have too many officers in the higher ranks and a deficiency of lower ranking officers as 
well as professional NCOs.  While the number of officers has dropped from 17,800 in 
1989 to 8,850 in 2002, this reduction is not consistent with the decrease in the total 
number of forces.   Not only do too many officers remain in the current force structure, 
but there are too many high ranking officers and not enough junior officers.156  This total 
remains in spite of extreme efforts like the forced retirement of all officers above the age 
of 55 years old in the mid 1990s.  Steps continue to be taken to rectify the problem.  For 
instance, the Ministry and the Defense Staff decreased their leadership personnel by 
around 20-percent in 2003. However, further leadership downsizing is still required.157 
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Second, like in most of the former Warsaw Pact nations, an increase in the 
numbers and qualifications of senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) is necessary to 
fulfill the requirements of a military force in the Western tradition.  Higher pay and better 
training will be necessary to attract the quality of professional Senior NCOs necessary.  
The HDF has already made great strides in this direction.  The number of Senior NCOs 
was increased from 2,700 in late 1997 to 5,000 by the year 2000.  As part of its 
deepening relations with NATO, Hungary has also signed a military training co-operation 
agreement with Turkey to help train its growing NCO corps.  NCO pay range has also 
improved and now reflects the national average wage. 158 
 
 
Table 3.  Changes in the Hungarian Defense Forces  (From159) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 % 
change 
Officers  11,217 11,350 9,800 9,113 8,850 -21.1 
NCOs  10,295 11,200 9,350 10,274 10,378 0.8 
Contract 
soldiers  
5,000 5,330 7,000 6,348 6,850 37 
Civilian 
employees  
13,593 11,880 11,996 7,566 5,865 -58.2 
Conscripts  21,026 19,735 16,918 11,802 11,080 -47.3 
Cadets etc  2,330 2,005 2,005 2,065 2,065 -12.6 
Total  63,461 61,500 57,069 47,168 45,088 -29 
 
Hungarians have always had a large conscript force, which provided a way to 
keep society in contact with the armed forces.  The conscript force has dropped 
drastically to around 11,000 but still remains the largest part of the force.  In response to 
the current distaste among the Hungarian population towards conscript service, primarily 
because of the horrible conditions conscripts have had to endure in recent years, the 
parliament has reduced the amount of time a conscript must serve from nine months to 
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six months as of January 1, 2002.160  While it is difficult to believe that conscripts 
serving for this short period of time could possibly be effective as soldiers, the service 
reduction will have the positive effect of continuing to whittle down the total number of 
conscripts.    
Whether to continue conscript service at all has been a hot topic in Hungary for 
several years.  Under the prior conservative government lead by Victor Orbán, it was 
argued that conscript service gave the population an opportunity to provide national 
service and promoted good civil-military relations.  The Orbán administration argued that 
if there was an all-professional military, the concept of national service would disappear 
and the military would lose even more support due to public disinterest.  However, it is 
suggested by others that these disadvantages can be overcome with the greater public 
esteem that would be given to those who serve in a professional military.  Outside the 
government of former Prime Minister Victor Orbán, mandatory conscription service has 
been deeply unpopular in Hungary for some time and the overwhelming weight of public 
opinion was in favor of its abolition.   
With the Socialist Party victory in April of 2002, it has now been decided that 
compulsory military service will finally be eliminated in the near future.161  Coming to 
the same conclusion as other 1999 NATO entrants and PfP partners but a little later, 
Hungarians have now formally concluded that an involuntary conscript force no longer 
has any capabilities that will help meet future military obligations.  Like most alliance 
members, the Hungarian’s now believe that only career professionals can handle modern 
missions.   Modern forces must be able to be mobilized quickly, be deployable, and be 
specialized – requirements that a revolving conscript pool cannot meet consistently.  
Final plans are now being put into place to develop an all-voluntary professional force by 
2006, though it will probably take years longer.  Though the Hungarian leadership 
realizes that they will have higher overall personnel salary expenses, they project that, in 
balance, the force will be more cost effective due to lower costs for preparation, training, 
maintenance, and repair of equipment.162  This ‘course correction’ probably has 
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everything to do with public demand since, during the 1990s, professionalization of the 
military was considered too expensive.163  The Defense Ministry has now established 
new force structure target percentages that they hope to achieve by 2006 in order to 
facilitate the new professional force (Table 4). 
 











In addition to changes to active service in Hungary, the entire reserve service will 
also need to be revamped under the voluntary system.  While a portion of reservists can 
be allocated from those who left the regular service, the new reserve system will also 
need to draw on from the untrained civilian ranks, both male and female.  This will be a 
challenge.165  For a brief time, there was a move afoot to establish a National Guard type 
organization to keep the idea of a conscript-style national service alive.  It would have 
been a reserve type force able to serve both traditional military and domestic type 
missions.  However, it appears that support for the National Guard concept has recently 
collapsed.166    
The Hungarian’s realize that a professional force will drive many other changes 
including a change in force structure as well as the force culture.167   It is projected that 
3,000 to 4,500 new recruits will be required annually to fill the ranks of the new armed 
forces during the conversion period.  A more ordinary annual flow of 1,350 to 2,250 
                                                 
163 Zoltan Banary, “Hungary: An Outpost on a Troubled Periphery,” 100.  
164 “Defense: Hungary,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments – the Balkans.  
165 “Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century,” Hungarian Defense Mirror, 16. 
166 Pál Dunay, “The Armed Forces in the Hungarian Society: Finding a Role?,” 13.  
167 “Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century,” Hungarian Defense Mirror, 15. 
58 
recruits will be required after the conversion is complete.  This will be a challenge.  In 
order to draw enough willing applicants, higher salaries and an incentive system will be 
necessary.  The Hungarian MoD is again developing plans to attract recruits, train 
professional soldiers, provide career enhancements, and develop an adequate retirement 
system.168  The numbers of new recruits required will make the Hungarian Army the 
employer requiring the largest number of new hires for years to come.  Unfortunately, up 
to this point, the attrition rate among current contract soldiers has been higher than is 
tolerable to meet the numbers required.  Also, recruiting contract quotas have fallen far 
short since 1997.  Only 4,000 of the authorized quota of 7,000 have been filled in recent 
years.169  For all of the reasons described as well as quality of life issues, enough of the 
eligible candidates do not consider service in the Hungarian military attractive.  As such, 
the vicious circle continues. 
If not addressed aggressively, quality of life issues will continue to undermine 
many of Hungary’s plans to improve their armed forces with a professional military.  
Current living conditions and salaries are substandard and not likely to be acceptable to 
professionals.170   As with the other services, the army is working hard to improve the 
living conditions and salaries of professional personnel.  This, along with other associated 
transition costs, is expected to absorb the bulk of the army's share of the defense budget 
over the next several years.171   
Though improving, the issue of military pay is a serious one in the HDF and  
threatens to undermine many positive efforts.  In real terms, compensation for military 
personnel is extremely low and many live below the poverty level.172  The rate of pay for 
an involuntary conscript soldier is only Ft7,000 ($32) per month. The rates for other 
enlisted soldiers are too low as well.  However, officers pay rates have improved and are 
considered more reasonable by civilian standard.  A lieutenant earns roughly Ft28,000 
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($128) per month. The average monthly pay for senior officers is Ft42,000 ($192) per 
month.  A top officer earns up to ft100,000 ($457) per month.  As previously mentioned, 
progress has been made in increasing NCO pay towards an acceptable level as well.  
However, military compensation remains a serious issue that has been reported on widely 
in Hungary, but has not yet been addressed to the extent necessary. 173 
 
F. MODERNIZATION EFFORTS 
The HDF consists of two services -- the army and the air force.  The 400-strong 
Maritime Wing, active on the Danube, is part of the army.  To integrate with NATO 
requirements, Hungary needs to possess both rapid reaction as well as ‘main,' or 
territorial defense forces.  Reaction forces include stand-by and rapid-reaction forces with 
high manning levels. Based on their organization, training, command system, modern 
technical equipment and logistics support, these must be able to act independently at 
home or, as a member of a NATO-led operation, in various operations abroad.  Hungary 
has been slowly modernizing and downsizing its armed forces since it left the Warsaw 
Pact in 1990.174  In line with other NATO forces, the Hungarian Army is being 
reorganized to meet the criteria required. In concert with the move from conscription to 
all-professional forces, the HDF's primary focus will be to prepare forces assigned to 
NATO's reaction forces and continue NATO-led peace support operations in Bosnia and 
Kosovo. 
In recent years the army has gone to great efforts to reorganize into two divisional 
commands.  However, Hungary has made only small efforts to modernize their military 
equipment to meet NATO standards.  The most significant equipment acquisition for the 
army since joining NATO is the Mistral 2 low-level air-defense missile, ordered in 1997.  
The contract for the Mistral 2 is believed to be worth in the neighborhood of $100 million 
(U.S.).  However, further funding for equipment procurement is likely to remain limited.  
The T-72M1 Main Battle Tank and the BTR-80 Armored Personnel Carrier will remain 
the backbone of the army's armored fighting vehicle fleet for at least the next decade. 
Service officials are planning to improve their interoperability with NATO forces by 
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making minor modifications to their existing armored vehicles to make them more 
compatible with NATO’s needs.  More ambitious equipment plans will have to await the 
completion of the transformation process.175 
The Hungarian Air Force is in the midst of significant re-organization and re-
equipment efforts of its own.  In September 2001, the service came under the auspices of 
the newly established Air Force Command. Marking the re-organization of the country's 
former Air Force Staff, the measure was another in a series of steps intended to bring not 
only Hungary's military equipment, but also its command procedures, into line with 
NATO standards. As an example of the current lack of inter-operability, the air force's 
MiG-29s lack Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF) units, and therefore cannot work in 
alliance operations. While the MiG-29 is being upgraded, several Soviet era ground 
attack fighters including MiG-21s have recently been retired.  Developments such as the 
introduction of new fighters and the ability to conduct more joint training should allow 
for greater Hungarian participation in future collaborative operations and exercises. 
Hungary has also offered NATO the use of assets such as its Mi-17 transport 
helicopters.176 
To address its desire to continue to control its own airspace, Hungary has been 
wrestling with the issue of replacing supersonic fighters for its retired MiG21s and aging 
MiG-29s.  Shortly after canceling the purchase of American F-16 fighters, in September 
of 2001, the Hungarian Ministry of Defense announced that it would lease 14 JAS-39 
Gripen multi-role fighters from Sweden. 177  Though less expense than the F-16, the 
decision set off a storm of controversy because, as configured, the Gripen fighters lack 
aerial refueling capability and cannot be used outside the continent.  Critics within the 
Hungarian government have charged that acquiring a fighter that could not be deployed 
by NATO was done intentionally by the Orbán cabinet.  Thus, the fighters could only be 
used for air intercept missions at home.  While others in the government have denied that 
they intended to evade generating an asset that NATO could use, it was noted tha t the 
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contract was written so that the Gripen’s could be modified to enjoy the capability of 
airborne refueling at a later date in the unlikely event that it became necessary. 178       
Once operational, the Gripen fighters will be assigned to replace the MiG-21 
fighters that are being retired.  Additionally, fourteen of the service's current MiG-29 
fighters began an upgrade program contracted to the Russians in 2002.  This step will 
keep them operational until around 2010. The upgrade includes equipping the aircraft 
with NATO-compatible systems. The MiG-29s are scheduled to be replaced by a new 
fighter early next decade.  It is projected that around 30 additional fighters will be 
acquired.  
G. NATO SUPPORT AND PERFORMANCE 
One of Hungary’s early values to the alliance has proven to be its location, due to 
its proximity to the nations making up the former Yugoslavia.  The United States and 
other alliance forces have used Hungarian airspace and the airbase at Tasár to support the 
Bosnian peace enforcement missions since 1996.  However, during the Yugoslav 
conflicts, the large ethnic Hungarian populations in both Serbia and Croatia, particularly 
in Vojvodina, were a constant concern.  As a result, Hungarian involvement in 
peacekeeping efforts was always being questioned inside Hungary. 179 Nobody wanted 
those of Hungarian decent opposing each other if hostilities ignited.  Nevertheless, in 
spite of a slow start, the HDF has constantly supported the efforts in Bosnia (i.e. SFOR) 
with an average of 200 people and it has consistently contributed an average of 325 
people to Kosovo Peace efforts (KFOR). These contributions are comparable to other 
alliance members of like size.180 Peace-support operations in Bosnia (i.e. SFOR) and 
Kosovo (i.e. KFOR) have provided the army with valuable experience conducting NATO 
operations. Unfortunately, despite NATO’s invoking Article 5, Hungary’s refusal to 
consider the deployment of soldiers to support Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan and offering only medical doctors was a disappointment.181 
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Outside of peacekeeping missions, Hungary's largest NATO commitment 
involves the 25th Mechanized Brigade that is dedicated to the Allied Command Europe 
Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).  The brigade is assigned to the 1st Armored Division 
(U.S.) headquartered in Germany.  In September 2001, the brigade hosted 1st Armory 
Division units for a 10-day interoperability exercise at Hungary's Hajmasker training 
area.182 
Hungary continues to fulfill NATO’s expectations by being an active participant 
in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.  Following a trilateral agreement signed by 
Hungary, Italy and Slovenia in October 1999, the three nations formally activated the 
Multinational Land Force (MLF) during Exercise “Esperia 2001”, taking place 
November of 2001 in Italy.  The MFL is tasked with peace-support operations under the 
auspices of NATO as well as the EU. 183  
 
H. CONCLUSION 
In review, Hungary had some advantages when it first joined NATO.  Its 
openness along with the existence of many private groups and private enterprises made 
democracy and free markets an easier transition than for other postcommunist countries.  
Democratic consolidation proved not to be a difficult objective compared to problems 
suffered by other former communist countries.  Additionally, Hungary has had a long 
tradition of civilian control of the military.  These critical factors, required for successful 
NATO integration, have given Hungary several advantages.  However, transformation of 
the military almost stalled due to disinterest. 
Due to abysmal defense spending, the modernization of armaments and 
equipment has never reached the stage were a professional military seemed necessary. 184  
Rather than embracing the professionalization of the military from a forward- looking 
vantage point, politicians are being pushed into it by a public opinion that has an extreme 
distaste for forced conscription.  There are no apparent movements afoot to embrace new 
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international commitments or changes in technology.  While the public expresses general 
support the Hungarian military and the security NATO brings them, they see no incentive 
to spend very much on it, because they see no territorial threats to Hungary requiring the 
military.  And there is no sign that they have a greater allegiance to the European or 
transatlantic communities as a whole, other than for what it can do for them as a nation.  
Like in the Czech Republic, nationalism continues to the extent that Hungary insists on 
patrolling its own airspace – something it really cannot afford to do.  However, they 
continue to do so, even to the point of endangering aircrews by not allowing them a 
sufficient number of flying hours.185  Hungary continue to spend a far smaller percentage 
of its GDP than it should to support NATO integration due to public disinterest, but also 
due to compromises made to achieve other societal goals.   
The military has slowly increased its prestige if not its effectiveness since the 
breakup of the Warsaw Pact.  Reforms are happening, though painfully slowly.  The HDF 
is putting forth a vigorous reform program but the challenge is always funding.  Hungary 
is an extreme example of what is plaguing European states that feel safe under the NATO 
umbrella.  The issue boils down to a vicious civil-military relations circle. In spite of 
what Hungarian politicians and military officials know is necessary, it is ultimately 
public’s priorities that drive the politicians.  Since the public believes that there are no 
current threats to Hungary as a member of NATO, the military is far down the priority 
list for new funding initiatives.  Other priorities are of much greater concern.  As such, 
the military remains impoverished to the point that some members are living below the 
poverty level with poor facilities, and little reason for any self-esteem. While the 
perception is accurate, one only need to look at Hungarian history and geography to see 
how easily it can be overrun, especially now that it only possesses one third of the 
territory that it once did.  It has no natural borders or other intimidating landmasses to 
protect it, and defensively, its military is much weaker than it was in 1989.186  Although 
it appears that many of the promises made to NATO upon accession were wishful 
thinking, the Hungarian defense ministry is learning from past mistakes and beginning to 
chart a more realistic course towards integration.  As long as the military continues 
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without a relevant role in postcommunist Hungary, it is likely to remain a secondary 
priority for some time to come.   
The case of Hungary provides evidence that, during the first round of NATO 
expansion, decisions regarding choosing new members were political more than 
substantive from a capabilities point of view.  Under the best scenario it will be many 
more years before the HDF will provide much in the way of operational military worth.  
So far the Hungarians have not lived up to either NATO’s expectations or their own 
promises, leading to allegations that they are the alliance “easyriders.”  However, as we 
have seen, public opinion inside Hungary makes it difficult to expect improvements in 
the near future.  There does not appear to be any solution to the problems, short of the 
possible emergence of inspired and resourceful leadership coupled with sustained 
economic growth to break the negative civil-military cycle.  
65 
IV.  INTEGRATION OF POLAND INTO NATO 
…Poland has been recognized as a success story in terms of its transition 
towards a consolidated democracy.  This is not to say that the country’s 
political life and institutions are a paragon of democratic virtue, but in 
comparative terms, it has defied critics by its ability to stay the course in 
the turbulent waters of transition. 187   
 
 
As a medium size power sandwiched between two larger powers, its geography 
has punished Poland.  Nevertheless, Polish society has long held their armed force in high 
prestige as the defender of the nation-state.  Interestingly, the unprecedented brutality of 
the Nazi and Soviet regimes forged strong bonds between Polish society and its soldiers.  
This bond was in spite of the inability of the Polish military to repel the invaders, 
particularly in 1939.   
After the Second World War, the communist led Polish Peoples Army (Ludowe 
Wojsko Polskiego, LWP) never really gained legitimacy in Polish society, remaining 
subservient to the Soviet Union.  Its officer corps was made up of a high percentage of 
non-Polish Soviet officers.188  As part of the Warsaw Pact, the LWP played an active role 
in the Soviet led crushing of the rebellion in Czechoslovakia in 1968.  Throughout its half 
century of existence, the LWP never truly achieved the status of a sovereign military.  It 
never really owed its primary allegiance to the Polish Government.189   
 
A. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Since the end of the communist era, the Polish military has fully regained its 
status in society.  In contrast to the Czech Republic and Hungary, the historical positive 
image of the armed forces has reemerged and has given significant support to Polish 
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efforts to integrate into NATO.  In a Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) opinion 
poll conducted in 1998 regarding the most popular institutions in society, the armed 
forces came in third place.  Only Polish radio and television were more popular.190  Other 
polling evidence conducted over a significant period of time seems to reinforce these 
results.  In February of 1998 and April of 2002, the armed forces occupied first place 
among institutions by 71-percent and 79-percent of respondents.191  The prestige of the 
military officer corps is also very high.  Opinion poll evidence in Poland shows that in a 
hierarchy of prestige among professions, being an army officer stands in fifth position, 
behind doctors, managing directors of major firms, university professors and diplomats.   
Since 1988, it appears that the prestige of the officer corps in society has increased.192   
Traditionalism in Polish society, highlighted by the strength of the Roman 
Catholic church, continues to be a catalyst of support for the military.  That being said, 
there is little evidence that many of the social questions that are high on the agenda of 
other long-standing NATO member states have emerged in the Polish civil-military 
relationship.  The Polish military is not in sync with the more liberal “postmodern” 
military agenda.  For example, while there has been a growth in opportunities for women 
in business and the professions in Poland, this has not carried over to the military. 193  
Women have now been introduced to the armed forces beginning in the medical field and 
other designated specialist areas, but their role is a modest one.  Extreme resistance to 
their entry remains.  While the number of women has been rising, in 2001 the number of 
women in the armed forces comprised only 288 with another 240 or so in training.  This 
means that women comprised only 0.1 percent of the forces, compared to 3.7-percent in 
the Czech Republic, 9.6-percent in Hungary, and 14-percent in the United States during 
the same time frame.  There are no designated programs designed to recruit a greater 
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portion of women in the armed forces.194  The recent high unemployment rate and the 
reduced size of the Polish military have not made that necessary.   
As another example of traditionalism in the military, and in striking exception to 
the communist period, “field ordinariates” for the Roman Catholic Church are active in 
the armed forces.  While this has provoked some criticism by those who feel that the 
uniformed priest has replaced the “political officer” of the Soviet era, because the church 
is so strong in Polish society, its influence has helped build bonds between the military to 
the mainstream of Polish society. 195   
In spite of the overwhelmingly positive attitude towards the military by the 
public, there are some warning signs likely to work against maintaining as high a level of 
support for the military in the future.  First, as mentioned, the processes of major 
economic and social change from the outside may be pushing the Polish attitude towards 
traditional military values in a different direction.  Despite the importance Poland 
attaches to NATO membership and co-operative security, few officials in Poland fear 
direct threat to Polish territory in the near future.  Instead, Warsaw identifies economic 
crisis, criminal organizations, and international terrorism as prime areas of concern.196  If 
Polish society starts to echo the concerns of their elites, the importance of the military 
may begin to depreciate. 
Second, for eighty years, conscription has traditionally played a role in attaching 
the Polish military to society in a positive way.  However, conscription has been greatly 
reduced in terms of the numbers required and the length of service.  In 1997, around 40-
percent of the pool of young men who became eligible were conscripted.  By 2001, the 
percentage had dropped to only 22-percent.  Current trends suggest that Poles may soon 
become willing to drop conscription all together, thus removing a critical link between 
society and the armed forces.197   
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Third, much of the public support for the armed forces appears to be built on 
traditional homeland and territorial defense missions.  However, the type of roles that 
NATO is likely to perform may require regular deployments for peacekeeping and 
Article 4 type power projection missions.  Opinion polls show that members of the Polish 
armed forces are willing to serve aboard.198  However, polling also suggests that 65-
percent of the public initially were opposed to sending troops to support the coalition 
operations in Afghanistan.  While subsequent polling in January of 2002 rebounded to 
suggest that opinion was evenly split, concerns regarding such missions persist.199  A 
more recent poll in July 2003 (CBOS) shows that around 55-percent of those polled were 
against Polish troop participation in the American lead Iraqi Freedom mission and only 
36-percent were supportive of it.200  While this mission was controversial across Europe, 
it still illustrates that, like other Europeans have demonstrated, the Poles are not afraid to 
oppose Western generated missions that do not fit into their security paradigm.  
Fourth, another conflict that is starting to face Poland as well as other former 
Warsaw Pact states is the apparent conflict between NATO and the EU’s European 
Security and Defense Policy.  Poland has consistently stated that it “…refuses to make a 
choice…” between NATO and its EU ambitions.201  While Poles were initially hesitant 
about the EU's ambition to set up a European security structure, the September 11th 
attacks on the United States in 2001 and the ensuing American tendency towards 
unilateralism may have weakened the role of NATO in the eyes of some.  In addition, the 
growing co-operation between the U.S. and Russia raises concerns in Warsaw about U.S. 
support for a strong and independent Ukraine.  Both trends are perceived by some as 
contradictory to the Polish security strategy that generally favors a strong U.S. presence 
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in Europe, a strong NATO, and a strong and independent Ukraine and Belarus to act as a 
buffer against future Soviet ambitions. While formally, Poland remains committed to 
American involvement in the EU as well as NATO, America’s apparent subordination of 
NATO to other interests has raised concerns in Warsaw.  Should such trends towards 
American unilateralism continue, Poland might increasingly begin to embrace EU 
aspirations to set up a defense and security policy. 202  As such, the EU could become a 
greater issue if European security architecture continues to evolve.203 
Finally, economic slowdowns are likely to force a reprioritization of support away 
from the military.  In the earlier years of market reform, Poland was seen as a miracle of 
market economic transformation.  The Poles maintained a phenomenal growth rate 
through the year 2000.  However, Poland has suffered a serve economic slowdown since.  
After a 4.0-percent GDP growth in 2000, GDP grew only 1.1-percent in 2001, and is 
projected at only 1.3-percent for 2002.   The good news is that inflation fell from 10.1-
percent in 2000 to less than 4-percent in 2001, and declined even further, to 1.7-percent 
in 2002.  However, real interest rates of 8 to 9 percent remain high by international 
standards and have resulted in a slowdown of investment activity.  The outlook for 2003 
remains moderately optimistic with GDP growth expected to pick up while keeping 
inflation low.  GDP is forecast to grow by 2.4-percent through 2003, a level slightly 
weaker than the Czech Republic or Hungary.  GDP is then projected to rise to around 3.6-
percent through 2004.  The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is projected to increase a modest 
1.2-percent in 2003 and 1.3-percent in 2004.  However, unemployment has been running 
at an untenable level of 17.0-percent, which is well above that of the average Central 
European state.204  From the vantage point of the Defense Ministry, unemployment is not 
an entirely negative event because it should continue to support recruitment for the armed 
forces. 
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In general, the economic picture described makes it difficult to fund the military.  
Poland’s desire to integrate into the European Union (EU) also limits funding for the 
military because the projected deficit for 2003 stands at around 4.8-percent of GDP.205  
This is above the 3.0-percent maximum deficit figure allowed for those states wishing to 
merge into the European Monetary Union (EMU) currency markets.  Just as in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, the Polish Military continues to get squeezed by the competing 
goal of EU currency integration.  
In spite of its severe economic dip, Poland is showing itself to be fairly resilient, 
both economically as well as politically.  After the famous Solidarity movements led by 
Lech Walesa in the 1980’s as well as the strength of the Roman Catholic Church in 
communist times, Poles proved to be better prepared than most for democracy and a 
market economy. 206  Considering the tremendous institutional shift that was required 
after the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Poland has had 
only a few bumps in developing what appears to be a stable democracy and a working 
market economy in less than a decade.  Poland’s  “Freedom House” scores are both 
excellent, listed as a “1” on the Human Rights scale and a “2” on the Civil Liberties scale 
consistently from 1993 through 2000.207  Poland is judged to have only a moderate 
amount of corruption compared to other former Warsaw Pact countries with a rating of 
4.0 on the corruption perception index in 2002, based on surveys conducted by 
Transparency International. 208  All of these achievements bode well for meeting NATO’s 
standards. 
Like many of the Warsaw Pact nations, Poland began its development of 
democracy in approximately 1989 with severe civil-military authority concerns.  This is 
partly because the Polish military has a long history of involvement in domestic 
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politics.209   Interestingly, it was the military’s involvement in politics that is recognized 
by many as what peacefully delivered Poland from under the dominance of Soviet 
communism to democracy.  Starting in the late 1970s, the legendary General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski became the defining figure in the Polish armed forces and, through the 1980s, 
the defining figure of all the autonomy that Poland maintained from the Soviet Union.  
When the Solidarity movement became a threat to the current communist state of affairs, 
it was “…Jaruzelski and his associates who replaced the party aparatchicks as the 
country’s leadership and offered the Soviets the Polish martial law solution as an 
alternative to an all-out invasion by the Warsaw Pact.”210  Serving as both the First 
Secretary of the Communist Party as well as the Prime Minister, Jaruzelski imposed 
Martial Law on December 13, 1981.  Later, as communist control weakened in the late 
1980s, it was Jaruzelski, while holding almost dictatorial control over nearly every 
institution of military and civilian power in Poland, who peacefully transferred power to 
members of the former Solidarity movement.  These were the same opposition members 
who had the stated goals of ending communism as well as punishing Jaruzelski and his 
associates.  Although a controversial figure in Poland, in the view of many, Jaruzelski 
protected the country from invasion and potential ruin until Soviet dominance had 
lifted.211    
The trend of politicization of the military continued into the 1990s, primarily due 
to inherent problems of the transition to an open society and the legacy of the past.  
Examples of allegations include the 1992 “Parys affair” and the 1994 “lunch at Drawsko 
affair.”212  By 1995, bitter infighting between the parliament and the president threatened 
a constitutional crisis over the issue of civilian control of the military.213   Structural 
irregularities made it difficult to define what powers controlled the Army, and to 
distinguish between the powers of the Defense Ministry and the Chief of the General 
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Staff.  Also typical for the former communist transition states of Europe, there were not 
clear lines of demarcation between the powers of the Chief of the General Staff and 
civilian components.  Another civil-military problem during the 1990s was that Poland 
lacked civilian expertise in military affairs.  As a result, most of the Defense Ministry 
was made up of military personnel.  This problem is recently resolving itself as 
successive Defense Ministers have slowly civilianized the MOD. 214  
To address these issues, a series of reforms and, in particular, the Law of the 
Office of the Defense Minister as well as the new Polish constitution of 1997 did much to 
clarify the roles of the different political institutions charged with democratic oversight of 
the armed forces.  In particular, these documents placed the Chief of the General Staff 
underneath the Defense Ministry.  A civilian Defense Minister was created.  The 
President was clarified to be the Commander in Chief.  Traditional oversight duties were 
clarified to belong to the Sejm (i.e. Parliament).  In July of 1999, the Polish government 
approved a set of regulations that will reorganize its top military leadership along the 
lines of the U.S. Joint Staff.  Term limits for these high command positions were 
introduced and Parliament gained control over the defense budget.215  In 2000, the 
General Staff of the Armed Forces was reshaped into a more coherent planning 
organization, aiming to strengthen civilian control of the Army. 216   All of these changes 
were encouraged by Poland’s desire to create an apolitical defense ministry and meet the 
standards required for NATO membership.217  The continued influence of NATO 
encourages the need for the military to remain subordinate to civilian authority.  As such, 
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B. DEFENSE BUDGETS 
Like most NATO members, Poland has reduced its spending as a percentage of 
GDP from 2.5-percent in 1988 to 2.3-percent in 1998. In comparative terms, Poland’s 
spending has been somewhat higher than the spending of its former Warsaw Pact 
neighbors.  Poland spent $3.2-billion in 1996, $3.5-billion in 1997, and almost $3.6-
billion in 1998.219  However, between 1997 and 2001, Polish defense spending was 
slowly reduced from 2.2-percent to 1.89-percent.  This is in spite of the fact that when 
Poland first joined NATO in 1999, it pledged to increase defense spending to 3.0-percent 
of GNP.  While its initial pledge was probably made with the most enthusiastic of 
intentions, the promise proved not to be realistic.  Polish officials now say that the 3.0-
percent of GDP figure is a long-term goal to be achieved over the next 15 years.220   In 
fact, through 2006, while there are indications that the Poles are actually spending more 
than promised, Poland is now only guaranteeing spending of 1.95-percent of its GDP on 
defense from 2001 through 2006.221  Like in the Czech Republic and Hungary, the desire 
to join the EU currency markets and economic slowdown has constrained Poland’s  
military appropriation.  That being said, as of 2001, Poland ranked eighth in relationship 
to the other NATO members in terms of defense spending as a percentage of GDP 
according to the Secretary of Defense’s 2001 report on allied burden sharing. 222   
While the percentage of GDP is a significant indicator of commitment, it indicates 
very little about a states immediate ability to contribute to the alliance.  For example, 
while Poland has approximately the same population as Spain with roughly 39 million 
people, the Polish GDP is much smaller.  Spain has a GDP of $568 billion. While 
devoting only 1.27-percent of its 2003 GDP to support the troop strength of 143,500, 
Spain is able to generate a defense budget of $7.2 billion.  Poland, on the other hand, will 
most likely devote close to 2.0-percent of its GDP to defense.  However, with a GDP of 
only $160 billion, its defense budget is less than half -- $3.3 billion -- that of Spain, and 
yet it continues to support a larger number of troops.  This comparison is quite telling of 
                                                 
219 “Integrating New allies into NATO,” CBO Paper, 6. 
220 Ibid., 5. 
221 Joseph Ralston in, “Successfully Managing NATO Enlargement,” NATO in the 21st Century – The Road 
Ahead, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2002, 
18.  Internet site http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0302/ijpe/toc.htm, accessed October 20, 2003.    
222 Ibid.    
74 
the problems encountered by most of the new emerging democracies of Central Europe.  
Obviously, the same capacity to modernize is not going to be present in Poland compared 
to Spain, in spite of a supportive society. 223   
 
C. RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION 
As in all of the former Warsaw Pact militaries as well as most western militaries, 
restructuring and modernization has been extensive and is ongoing in spite of funding 
challenges.224  When one considers the size of the force being transformed, the Polish 
armed forces have survived with prestige and high morale intact.  In addition to 
weathering continuous political change, in 1988, the Polish armed forces numbered more 
than 400,000.    By 1995, force strength was cut by 40-percent.  At the end of 2003, 
active force levels should drop to 165,000 with around 59-percent of them being 
conscripts.  Poland also maintains a separate reserve totaling another 400,000.225  Further 
reductions are planned.  It appears that active force levels are slated to be dropped to as 
low as 150,000 be the end of 2006.226  Unfortunately, the rapid downsizing of the army, 
which dropped by 42,000 troops in 2001, spells increased unemployment in many regions 
in Poland, where the military is the only employer in the vicinity.227  However, reducing 
the force levels has to be done for further modernization to take place.  In contrast to 
Hungary, there is no sign that demographics and low military pay in Poland will preclude 
its ability to support its force structure any time soon. 228 
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Poland has been working hard to change its Warsaw Pact style “reverse pyramid” 
command structure.  In spite of severe cuts during the early 1990s, by 1998, the Polish 
military still maintained 3,500 Colonels and 120 Generals.  Cuts in officer ranks are 
continuing at a pace that is deemed palatable.  While continuing to retire many high-
ranking officers, professional Senior NCOs continue to be developed to replace many of 
these officers and assume a more Western style military.  Recognizing the need to build a 
corps of professional non-commissioned officers (NCO), plans call to increase their 
numbers from 28-percent of the professional force in 2001 to 67-percent in 2006.   The 
rank of warrant officer is being eliminated, and the number of officers will be cut from 
42-percent of the present career force to 33-percent by 2006, most of the cuts coming 
from the senior ranks.229   
Poland continues to drastically cut the number of conscripts, recently cutting the 
term of conscription from 24 months to 12 months.  With the greatly reduced number of 
conscripts, the remaining conscript force can now be concentrated on territorial defense, 
allowing the professional military to handle technical missions.230   The idea of moving 
completely to an all-volunteer professional armed forces is not yet resolved in Poland and 
continues to be debated at a high level.  Some officials expect that an all-volunteer 
service can be realized by the end of the decade.  In the short run, economic and political 
considerations are the limiting factor.  However, in the long run, an all-volunteer force is 
projected by many to be more cost effective and will be better able to meet future 
requirements.  While trends in Poland seem to be leading it towards an all-volunteer 
professional force, a decision in this direction has not yet been made.231 
The impact of the large-scale manpower reductions on civil-military relations, 
particularly among the professional (i.e. volunteer, non-conscript) element has not been 
well studied in Poland.  However, the turbulence does not appear to have affected the 
prestige of the Polish military to the same degree as it has in the Czech Republic or 
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Hungary.  The prestige of the officer corps generally remains quite high.  Opinion poll 
evidence in Poland shows that in a hierarchy of prestige among professions, being an 
army officer stands in fifth position behind doctors, managing directors of major firms, 
university professors and diplomats.   Since 1988, it appears that the prestige of the 
officer corps in society has increased.232   
The downsizing of forces has left its negative marks on the officer corps.  While 
85-percent of the downsizing has been completed by encouraging resignations, it has 
been suggested by some that the wrong people have been leaving.  While overall force 
goals have still been meet, retaining officers with critical skills has been an issue.233  Pay 
and training issues among the officer corps may be partially to blame.234  Nevertheless, it 
does appear that Poland has been weathering force reductions better than could have been 
expected.   
 
D. PLANS FOR REFORM 
Poland has made steady progress towards reorganizing its military in a way that 
integrates well with NATO.   The process has been unsettling for the officers in charge 
because the military is trying to work at changing everything at once, including force 
structure, staff organizations, training programs, doctrine, security procedures and so 
on.235  In addition to a reasonable level of defense spending, another reason for the good 
progress in making defense reforms is because of good continuity in the Polish planning 
process.  The Defense Ministry has been able to stay on task.  The Polish have published 
two editions of The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland – one in 1992 
and another in 2000.236  These documents are quite general in nature.  To apply the 
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National Security Strategy, as well as to apply The NATO Strategic Concept, the Ministry 
of Defense publishes The National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland.237  This 
document was last published in 2000. With its new roles in NATO in mind, in 2001, the 
Polish Defense Ministry published The Program of Restructuring and Technical 
Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland to develop plans to 
prioritize the modernization the armed forces.238   Based on results, theses planning 
documents seem to have led to a very systematic approach to implementing a detailed 
modernization plan.  
To systematize the more general planning documents, significant detailed reform 
towards integration into the NATO alliance began on September 9, 1997 with the fifteen 
year program.  The program is outlined in a strategic plan entitled Army 2012: the 
Foundation of the Modernization Program for the Armed Forces 1998-2012.239  This 
plan set a road map for integration into NATO with the assumption that nothing would 
disturb the peace for the following thirteen years.  Then, in December 1999, then Defense 
Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz defined the role of the armed forces as the protection of 
independence and the democratic system.  He listed three specific threats: types of 
operations involving special forces; troop concentrations on the Polish border; and 
counter-terrorism.  Onyszkiewicz states that military doctrine has to be developed based 
on the notion that military capabilities should suffice to defend the national territory, but 
they should not be so great as to threaten the security of neighboring states.  Additionally, 
the defensive character of the Polish armed forces should be obvious from their size, 
structure and deployment.  The current defense strategy does not assume the existence of 
a specific enemy who is prepared to carry out acts of aggression.  It assumes, however, 
the existence of potential threats and it aims to control and solve crisis situations of a 
military nature.240 
 
                                                 
237 “The National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland,” The Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw, 
2000, 3. 
238 Bronislaw Komorowski, “Reforming Poland’s Military,” NATO Review: Web Edition, Vol. 49 – No. 2, 
Summer 2001, 26-27, Internet site http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0102-08.htm, accessed October 22, 2003. 
239 Michta, America’s new Allies: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO, 51. 
240 “Armed Forces - Poland,” Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States . 
78 
E. PROGRESS OF REFORMS 
In spite of the budget constraints, NATO officials including Gen. Joseph Ralston, 
Supreme Allied Commander of European Command (EUCOM), have noted positive 
results towards the modernization of Poland’s military. 241  Like all the former Warsaw 
Pact states, the need for restructuring is resulting from the change in military doctrine 
requiring both an offensive and a defensive strategy instead of a purely defensive one. 
This entails a replacement of territorial defensive forces from facing to the West to being 
able to act defensively on all bearings as well as to be better prepared to deploy.   
However, the bigger task is achieving compatibility with NATO and adoption of NATO 
standards, such as the creation of a Logistics Branch.  In general, this means switching 
the emphasis from heavy armor to lighter, more mobile forces.  The force structure based 
on heavy amour divisions destined for offensive operations is being replaced with a more 
flexible mix of light, rapid reaction forces and more maneuverable brigade-size armored 
units, which are better suited for defense.  Again, like all of the former Warsaw Pact 
states, this means replacing a significant amount of equipment that is now obsolete.242 
With over 165,000 personnel, nearly 300 combat aircraft and 14 major naval 
vessels, Poland clearly has the largest Army, Air Force, and Navy in Central Europe.  
Budget constraints are currently slowing modernization and retraining of the armed 
forces as has been mentioned.  After achieving NATO membership at the 1999 Madrid 
conference, Poland now realizes that it no longer needs to achieve an “all around” 
defense, but can instead concentrate on being a good niche player within the broader 
NATO umbrella.   
So far, Poland has made the greatest progress of the three recent members towards 
integrating its military into NATO.  Its larger defense budgets, sustained progress in 
accomplishing their detailed modernization plan, and strong political support of the 
alliance have been key.  However, the financial problems facing the Polish armed forces 
are of potential long-term concern, particularly if Poland is expected to pull its weight in 
the future as a NATO member.   To help finance further reform, the modernization plans 
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call for a continuing reduction of obsolete equipment, the closure of facilities, the 
reduction of manpower as well as the restructuring of forces.   
Current plans to reduce and restructure the force have already been discussed.  
The withdrawal of obsolete equipment and closure of facilities includes plans to take out 
of service hundreds of T-55 tanks and shells, 100 combat aircraft and eight combat ships 
as well as to close barracks, bases, and training grounds.  Further reductions should come 
from changing procurement procedures and contracting out services to the private sector.  
These cost cutting measures should allow the defense ministry to increase the proportion 
of its budget allocated to capital expenditure from the level of 12-percent to 23-percent 
by 2006. By that time, one third of the military – rapid reaction and strategic covering 
forces – should be interoperable with other NATO militaries, adapted to NATO standards 
regarding armaments, equipment, mobility, and the ability to operate in complex missions 
beyond Polish territory. 243  
To review further detailed steps being taken and their status to date, a review of 
each service -- the Land Forces, Air and Air Defense Forces, and Navy -- is required.  
 
1.  Land Forces  
In spite of severe budget constraints, Poland has taken many positive steps to 
modernize and restructure their Land Forces (Wojska Ladowe; WL).  72-percent of the  
current 110,000 soldiers who make up the Land Forces are conscripts.  Current plans are 
to reduce these forces to 89,045 soldiers. 45-percent of this complement will be 
professional soldiers and the remaining 55-percent will be conscripts.244   
Traditionally organized in four districts, the Land Forces are currently being 
reduced to two districts - a Northern Military District and a Southern Military District.  A 
number of battalions are to be disbanded and others transferred to new garrisons that are 
closer to operational areas and firing ranges to reduce training costs.  A separate Airborne 
Mechanized Corps Headquarters in Krakow will control the still incomplete airmobile 
25th Air Cavalry Division (ACD), the showpiece of the Polish armed forces, as well as 
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four further brigades: armored, mechanized, air assault, mountain and territorial defense.  
These changes are increasingly preparing the Land Forces to participate in multinationa l 
efforts.245 
Like most Western armies, the Poles are starting to manage downsizing 
requirements by outsourcing requirements to private ventures.  For instance, in 2001, the 
logistics branch began outsourcing messing requirements to civilian catering companies 
that are to provide full service for local units.  This is but one example of relaxation in the 
traditional Land Force mindset that has, at times, resisted change.246  
Equipment modernization is taking place slowly.  The Polish Land Forces are 
planning to deploy a new tactical- level unmanned air vehicle system, which can be 
developed by the Polish domestic aerospace industry with limited input from a foreign 
partner. The Land Forces are also strengthening their armored forces and increasing the 
number of vehicles per battalion.  Extensive upgrades are planned for the 400 existing T-
72M Main Battle Tanks.  Also planned is the procurement of 128 Leopard 2A4 Main 
Battle Tanks from Germany to increase interoperability with other NATO systems, 
particularly the German forces.  The Land Forces are developing a completely new 
national Command, Control and Communications (C3) system in line with NATO 
standards.  Numerous other purchases are also being made including Multiple-Launch 
Rocket Systems (MLRS) and second hand light attack helicopters.  The Land Forces are 
slated to put increasing emphasis on army aviation starting in 2006.247 
 
2.  Air and Air Defense Forces (A&ADF) 
The Polish Air and Air Defense Forces (A&ADF) have long been neglected and 
are heavily constrained by cash shortages causing numerous problems.  Flying hours 
have dropped as low as 60 flying hours per year.  For comparison purposes, 100 hours 
per year is generally considered to be a safe minimum, and pilots in the UK and 
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elsewhere fly approximately 200 hours per year. As a result, accidents have increased, 
both from inadequate pilot training and from poor maintenance.248  
In addition to the need for flying hours, Poland’s aging Soviet-designed aircraft 
are increasingly expensive to maintain, and not interoperable with NATO systems.  
Currently, the Poles own approximately 250 operational fighters, some of them in 
storage.  As procurement and doctrine decisions take place, it is obvious that a real effort 
is being made to achieve compatibility with western practices.249  As a first step to 
remedy the problem of aging and incompatible aircraft, the government announced the 
agreement to purchase 48 F-16 Fighting Falcon’s with Lockheed Martin Aeronautics 
Company on December 27, 2002. The purchase was expensive for Poland, costing an 
estimated $3.8 billion (U.S.) that will be financed by the U.S. through a low interest loan. 
However, the F-16s makes a significant contribution to the upgrade of the Polish Air 
Force to NATO standards.  They will be delivered between 2006 and 2008.250  Also, in 
January 2002, Germany offered Poland twenty-two MiG-29 fighters inherited from East 
Germany after German unification. 251   
Senior officers foresee a smaller fleet of around 100 modern combat aircraft after 
2012.  The current fighter procurement was postured in such a way as to establish 
generational compatibility with follow-on procurement, which many believe should be 
the new U.S. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a multi-contractor project directed by 
Lockheed. These aircraft should be available to Poland in 2014 at the latest.  However, 
there are other aircraft being considered at for future procurement including the 
Eurofighter Typhoon.  Many of the MiG-29 air-defense fighters mentioned earlier are 
currently being upgraded with new communication and navigational aids so they are 
NATO compatible.  The primary Polish attack aircraft -- the SU-22M4 -- should stay in 
service until 2012.  It will only be upgraded if other fighter procurement talks collapse.  
However, a program is under way to install modern, secure communications equipment 
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and navigational aids on at least forty SU-22 aircraft assigned to rapid-reaction force 
squadrons.  In order to achieve cost savings needed to procure new aircraft, the Poles are 
closing most of their current air bases, leaving fourteen of them operational and 
concentrating on improving  the capabilities of seven primary airbases.252 
Along with the aircraft, the Polish, Air Defense (AD) facilities fall under the 
A&ADF as well.  Manning the A&ADF are AD personnel who man the high- level SAM 
batteries and the early warning radars.  Many of the A&ADF facilities are in poor 
condition.  Also, 55-percent of troops serving in the A&ADF forces are conscripts.  
Another concern for NATO is that Polish radar coverage looks mostly westward from 
fixed sites.  Radar coverage for airspace to the east remains patchy.  The facilities are 
made up of mostly Warsaw Pact era equipment that is nearing the end of its useful 
service life. Troop morale in these services has been shaken by the frequent 
reorganizations, poor pay, poor conditions, and the precarious state of the equipment.  
There are plans under way to develop and modernize the ground-based air defenses and 
preliminary discussions have been launched on a possible loan of used Patriot missile 
systems.253 
 
3.  Navy 
Poland's navy, the Marynarka Wojenna (MW), is recognized as the best-managed 
service, with an effective staff and well-defined areas of co-operation with domestic 
industry.  However, of the three services, it also receives the smallest share of the defense 
budget. The procurement budget for 2001 was insufficient to fulfill current requirements 
or to support future projects.  Nevertheless, the force at its disposal is considerable in 
regional terms. It possesses three submarines, two major surface combatants and eleven 
other vessels capable of engaging with missiles from below the horizon.  There are 2,900 
men in the Maritime Border Guard who have 28 patrol craft. Almost all vessels are 
Russian, of Cold War vintage.  The Poles have a long seagoing tradition that will ensure 
continued support.  Most Poles still remember that the German attack on them in 1939 
began with a naval bombardment from the pre-dreadnought battleship Schleswig 
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Holstein, while it was supposedly making an official friendly visit to the city of Danzig-
Gdansk.254  
In line with the other forces, Navy manning levels are dropping, and are now 
down to a total of 13,500 personnel.  55-percent of the Navy are professional personnel, 
the remaining being conscripts.  Currently, the Polish Navy is endeavoring to modernize 
its inventory with new NATO-compatible systems.  To secure funding for a number of 
ambitious future programs, the navy is expecting to retire twenty aging vessels by 
2003.255 
The Navy is responsible for seaward defense of the coast as well as search and 
rescue type missions.  However, on land, the army controls the Coastal Brigade.  There is 
close cooperation in coast watching between the three armed services, and the maritime 
border guard.  Of the three flotillas, two are designated for Coastal Defense. 
Poland's navy has aspirations beyond its traditional focus on the Baltic, however, 
and is concentrating on active co-operation with other NATO navies including the 
Germans and the Danish.  Aside from funding constraints, the enclosed geography of the 
Baltic will likely preclude the Navy from ever being a key NATO fleet.  The Navy has 
already increased NATO capabilities in the Baltic area, providing five Lublin-class 
transport and mine laying vessels.   However, in view of its effectiveness and experience 
in littoral waters, by cooperating with other Navies, it will be useful for allied operations 
at some point in time.256  In the longer term, Poland is likely to embrace Polish-Danish 
co-operation regarding sealift capabilities.  
Poland itself plans to establish at least a single sea-assault battalion around 2010.  
It also plans to upgrade its capabilities in littoral waters and countermine operations by 
procuring the first of between ten to fourteen new Kormoran-class mine-hunters, to be 
built domestically in partnership with a foreign shipyard, around 2006.  Additionally, 
Poland has a joint agreement with Turkey to modernizing its two primary naval bases - 
Gdynia-Oksywie and Swinoujscie.  Both bases are to act as key ports for NATO ships in 
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the eastern part of the Baltic.  According to NATO obligations, all works funded 
primarily from the NATO Security Investment Program funds must be completed by 
2005, which has helped the Navy convince government officials to approve projects 
quickly.257 
Polish Naval Aviation was only formed in 1995 but has already enhanced 
Poland’s military capability.  Currently, it consists of a single brigade with seven air 
squadrons, a technical squadron and logistics battalions.  It comprises 2,460 men with 28 
combat aircraft, eleven armed helicopters, and 65 other aircraft.  Of the seven squadrons 
of naval aviation, two are made up of fighters (MiG-21), one is made up of 
reconnaissance aircraft (TS-11 Iskra) and the rest are either wholly or in part rotary wing.   
The Naval Aviation Brigade has so far weathered the worst cuts and still boasts 
around 85 aircraft.  As part of a wider process of withdrawing older aircraft from service, 
Naval Aviation is to retire all of its MiG-21s by 2004.  The Navy is trying to procure a 
more capable replacement.  To replace rotary-wing aircraft, modernized anti-submarine 
warfare helicopters are being received with upgraded electronic equipment and armed 
with the latest torpedoes.  Polish and U.S. experts have also discussed final details about 
the delivery of four Kaman helicopters received from the U.S. Naval Reserve for their 
seven frigates.258  
 
F. NATO SUPPORT AND PERFORMANCE 
The Poles have shown their commitment by fully supporting all of the NATO led 
contingencies abroad since becoming a Partnership for Peace (PfP) participant in 1993.  
Poland has contributed an average of 785 troops to the Kosovo Stabilization Force 
(KFOR).  In response to NATO’s April of 2000 call for additional reserve forces to 
support KFOR, the Poles quickly sent an additional 700 troops.  This unexpected 60-day 
rotation ended up lasting more than five months.259   Poland has also consistently 
maintained an additional 250 troops in Bosnia as part of the Bosnian Stabilization Force 
(SFOR).  This number has recently been increased to 450 troops.260  For comparison 
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purposes, Poland is of the equivalent size as Spain, both in terms of population as well as 
having a similar number of military forces as was mentioned previously.  With doub le the 
size of the defense budget, Spain has maintained around 960 as part of KFOR and 1350 
as part of SFOR. 261   Under the circumstances, most officials have been satisfied with 
Poland’s contribution in view of this comparison and the circumstances that surround it.   
More recently, approximately 275 Polish soldiers were sent to support the U.S. 
led effort in Afghanistan in February 2002.  Poles have been heavily involved in nearly 
every international involvement in the war on terrorism since.262   Poland has also 
committed a division of 2,400 troops to the Polish- lead international peace keeping force 
in Iraq.  While Iraq is not a NATO led operation, the North Atlantic Council has 
approved providing the support requested by Poland for the operation, including help 
with force generation, communication, logistics, and movements.263  The first soldiers of 
the division began arriving in Baghdad in July 2003 and are closely co-operating with the 
U.S. and British militaries.  The U.S. Pentagon is paying two-thirds of the cost of the 
Polish deployment while the Polish government has agreed to pay one third.264  As 
previously discussed, recent Polish public support has been uncertain for these types of 
forays.   Nevertheless, the current deployment of the Polish forces to Iraq is the largest 
Polish deployment since the Second World War.   As such, Poland is showing that it is 
fully willing to support ‘out-of-area’ missions as well as the international war against 
terrorism.265 
All of the recent peacekeeping and peace-enforcement deployments have 
provided Poland an excellent opportunity to present the capabilities of the Polish Land 
Forces (Wojska Ladowe; WL) to NATO.  The number of Polish units assigned to 
NATO’s various reaction forces is increasing each year.  Currently, NATO strategic 
plans call for Poland to contribute one armored division; one mechanized division; one 
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parachute brigade; one interoperable infantry brigade; a Search and Rescue unit; and one 
air combat squadron for the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).  Additionally, one 
division is assigned to the Czech-Polish-Slovak Multinational Corps Peacekeeping 
Brigade.  It is designed to provide a NATO-standard brigade for rapid deployment to out-
of-area operations, with the aim of operational readiness by December 2005.266  
Since becoming a member, Polish facilities have added to NATO’s capacity in 
various ways.  Poland’s airspace and bases has provided NATO the reach needed for 
hypothetical contingencies in the Baltic Sea or in the western part of the former Soviet 
Union.267  PfP and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) deployments and exercises 
are often held on Polish ranges and facilities.268  On October 20, 2003, NATO announced 
plans to open a troop-training center in Poland for its rapid-reaction force within a year. 
This is the alliance’s first major institution in a former Soviet bloc country.  Polish 
barracks and staff will be used to support the facility.269 
As a former Warsaw Pact member, Poland is in a unique position and has a 
geographical incentive to positively impact former Soviet states.  It is an active mentor 
for other states aspiring to join NATO.  In particular, the Poles are active in providing 
military-to-military contacts with Lithuania.270  Additionally, Poland has been working to 
encourage the Ukraine to adopt pro-western policies.  According to Polish Ambassador 
Przemyslaw Grudzinski, Poland believes that it has a unique understanding of the 
challenges and trials facing former Soviet states like the Ukraine and can influence them 
positively. 271 U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has recently stated that Poland 
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will play an important role in advising the military of any new nations accepted into 
NATO.272 
As promised when Poles achieved NATO membership, Polish officials strongly 
express their support for further enlargement.  However, the Polish government seems 
most committed to seeing its neighbors, Slovakia and Lithuania join the alliance.  
Nevertheless, officials emphasize that they do not mean to exclude any candidates.273   
 
G. CONCLUSION 
The fact that the Polish armed forces have long been better respected and better 
supported by their society has been the difference that has allowed them greater funding, 
greater progress, and a brighter future than either of the armed forces of the Czech 
Republic or Hungary.  Poland’s positive public support also bodes well for NATO since 
the armed forces of Poland are more than double the size of the other two new members 
combined.  It remains to be seen if the nostalgic traditional support Poles have provided 
their armed forces remains as they modernize and continue to deploy internationally as a 
member of NATO.   
Poland further demonstrates what a tremendous challenge it is for Central 
European states to shed the legacy of the Warsaw Pact on their restricted military budget.  
While the Solidarity movement along with the influence of the Roman Catholic Church 
allowed Poland to Westernize their society quickly after the disintegration of the Warsaw 
Pact, many of the problems of the Polish military in their integration into NATO are 
similar to the problems encountered by both the Czech Republic and Hungary.  While the 
morale of the Polish military has remained reasonably high in the face of downsizing, the 
overall restructuring job is bigger in Poland because of the greater size of the military.  
Continued downsizing will only get harder due to high unemployment, yet, it remains 
necessary to modernize.  In the meantime, Poland has mostly met or exceeded the 2.0-
percent of GDP spending on the military goal that NATO requests from its newest 
members.  However, a large portion of funding is being used for pensions and wages 
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instead of modernization.  Due to the recent economic downturn and the desire to reduce 
debt in order to gain EU membership, it does not appear that Poland will continue to 
consistently meet the 2.0-percent figure.  Worse still, constant turbulence and 
reorganization of military departments that are ultimately responsible for modernization 
decisions means that progress is slowed, due to the challenges of meeting multiple 
changing requirements at the same time.274   
Regardless of the challenges, because of its larger defense budgets, sustained 
progress in accomplishing a detailed modernization plan, and strong support of NATO’s 
missions, Poland leaves no regrets related to its acceptance into the alliance.275  In 
comparison to the other two 1999 NATO entrants, nobody questions Polish commitment 
or is questioning the wisdom of future expansion based on the Polish experience.  
However, Despite the Poles' enthusiasm and deep commitment, the Central European 
region will not significantly enhance NATO's military might any time soon.  But given its 
location, Central and Eastern Europe could and should play a positive role in pushing the 
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V.  FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
All of Europe’s democracies, from the Baltics to the Black Sea and all that 
lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom – and 
the same chance to join the institutions of Europe – as Europe’s old 
democracy’s have. 
    George W. Bush, Warsaw, June 15, 2001 
The primary purpose of this thesis has been to determine certain insights for 
policymakers from the experience of the 1999 NATO accessants in their pursuit of 
alliance integration that might be of benefit to the new round of aspirants, expected to 
achieve membership in May of 2004.   A second purpose has been to determine what can 
be done to mitigate similar challenges that the newest round of alliance members might 
encounter.   
 
A. DIFFERENCES IN ENLARGEMENT BETWEEN 1999 AND 2004  
Since the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO almost five years 
ago, the geo-strategic circumstances will be different for the 2004 accessants to be sure. 
As such, any comparison needs to be kept in context for several reasons.  First, the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) has evolved into a much more comprehensive policy 
than the so-called “Perry Principles” that made up the criteria under which the 1999 
accessants joined the alliance.  Since it was passed April 24, 1999, MAP’s nine pages of 
detailed standards provided a roadmap, which makes meeting the criteria for membership 
more transparent for the aspirants.  MAP should give greater certainty to what was 
previously an evolving standard. 
Second, circumstances will be different for each of the 2004 aspirants because, as 
we have learned from the case studies, the unique historical circumstances of each 
matters.  The case studies of the first round entrants show that the history of each has 
affected both their political and economic success, as well as being a root cause of their 
failures.  The unique history of each has affected their civil-military affairs well as their 
ability to integrate into NATO.  While there are significant similarities between the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, noting that each was part of the Warsaw Pact and 
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under Soviet domination, each has unique differences of state and society.  For instance, 
the societal status of those who serve in the military seems to be much higher in Poland 
than in the Czech Republic or Hungary.  This factor alone has proved significant for 
Poland’s greater success of integrating into the alliance.   
Finally, it should be noted that, via PfP, the militaries of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have been operating as part of NATO 
missions in the Balkans and elsewhere as long as have the Czechs, Hungarians, and 
Polish.  Therefore, in view of the additional time that they have had to work with NATO 
prior to becoming candidates for membership, one might expect that the 2004 NATO 
aspirants would have a less difficult time integrating their militaries with NATO, all other 
things being equal. 
 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
Tremendous patience by NATO officials regarding the pace of integration will be 
required for the new NATO members.  While the case studies show that each of the 1999 
accessants appear to have consolidated their democracy, established a stable civil society 
and  market economy, and developed appropriate civil-military relations, the slow pace of 
economic prosperity has contributed to low funding for the armed forces.  As such, 
modernization and integration into NATO is moving slowly.  Additionally, much of the 
defense budgets are still being used to fund residual salary and pensions left over from 
the larger cold war militaries.  This factor also exacerbates the slow pace of 
modernization.  While the rapid reduction of forces is helping reduce this drag on the 
modernization of the military, it remains a significant factor.   However, the effect of 
residual personnel costs will not be a factor in all of the 2004 aspirant militaries.  Those 
that were independent states or part of independent states prior to the breakup of the 
Warsaw Pact -- Bulgaria, Romania, and to some extent, Slovakia -- have pre-existing 
militaries and, therefore, are dealing with legacy personnel costs.  The remaining states -- 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia -- did not have independent Warsaw Pact war 
militaries and will not have as severe a burden. 277 Obviously, this later group will be able 
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to put a greater percentage of their funding allocation into modernization, all things being 
equal.  Nevertheless, because they are starting with little, they also have a significant 
burden. 
In addition to patience, NATO officials can fairly assume that the new aspirants 
are exaggerating their capabilities and commitments and should plan accordingly.  As we 
have seen during the last round of enlargement, many of the capabilities and 
commitments of the 1999 accessants still remain unfulfilled.   Officials can expect that, as 
the new round of PfP militaries are reduced and restructured over the next decade, human 
and financial resources will be stretched beyond capacity.  This was certainly the 
experience in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.  As evidence, in June of 2000, 
Hungarian Defense Minister Gyoergy Keleti said bluntly that, “… in order for Hungary 
to achieve NATO membership, it made commitments it was not prepared to keep.”278  
The MAP partners who are expected to gain NATO membership in 2004 will, no doubt, 
be exaggerating defense planning and force capabilities to accommodate their political 
and security objectives in a similar way.  After membership is achieved, unless an 
unforeseen threat emerges, priorities will likely change away from NATO’s concerns.  
The focus of the populations in the aspirant states is likely to be on societal goals other 
than military security.  NATO membership may create some social tensions because of 
the competing interests within these societies.279   The degree of exaggeration by the 
aspirants may be mitigated by the fact that PfP missions and the formalized MAP process 
will create a greater awareness of their true commitment and capabilities prior to 
membership. 
Related to the issue of the ability of member states to fulfill commitments, a 
review of the 1999 accessants shows that it is ultimately the taxpayers in the candidate 
countries that need to make good on the commitments NATO membership brings.  As in 
the Czech case, when taxpayers are neither involved in the decision to join NATO, nor 
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informed about the costs of accession, it becomes difficult for the new member state to 
meet their commitments.280 
Another significant lesson from the previous round of members is the tremendous 
burden the Air Force is likely to place on the ability of the current aspirants to modernize.  
The insistence of each 1999 accessant to have its own independent Air Force has created 
a significant drain on the resources available for any other type of military modernization 
projects.  In the cases of the Czech Republic and Hungary, the majority of funds 
earmarked for modernization are allocated to modernizing the Air Force.  The Air Force 
is also a major drain on the funding in Poland.  All the while NATO officials have 
discouraged both the Czechs and the Hungarians from investing in fighter aircraft at the 
expense of more pressing modernization projects.  Instead of heeding this advice, the 
Czechs and Hungarians are procuring less expensive types of aircraft for acquisition – 
types that are not particularly useful to NATO.   It is difficult to support the wisdom of 
this decision on strategic grounds alone.  Because of the ‘economies of scale’ required for 
small, economically strapped states to maintain modern fighter aircraft, many of the 
current NATO aspirants are struggling with similar questions.281 
In response to the problems associated with the desire of former-communist states 
to maintain independent air forces, there is a need for a more thorough debate on such 
procurement issues in general.  For many of the Central and Eastern European states, it 
may well make more sense to allocate resources to ground-based air defenses, airspace 
monitoring systems and developing base infrastructure for the forward deployment of 
aircraft from larger Allies.  An alternative approach might involve the development of 
genuinely multinational squadrons of fighter aircraft designated to provide air defense.  
Professor Pal Dunáy and others have suggested that a shared Air Force between a group 
of Central European states under the NATO and EU umbrella might provide better 
economies of scale and help these states support a more potent Air Force.282  The states 
of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have already established the Central 
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European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) among themselves to help merge their 
economies.283  Perhaps a parallel agreement could be developed to merge the fighter 
aircraft assets in these same states by developing a parallel agreement.  Perhaps a similar 
agreement could be signed between the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and 
another one between the Balkan states (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia).  In this way, all of 
the former communist states joining NATO could support some portion of their desire for 
air sovereignty while achieving a force multiplier.  In addition they will achieve greater 
‘economies of scale’ and save funding for other modernization projects.    
 In spite of the many ways that militaries of Central Europe might be able to 
operate more efficiently, the case studies show that, once being granted the security of 
becoming alliance members, there is reluctance by the 1999 accessants to appropriately 
fund their militaries.  This problem is obvious in Hungary as well as in the Czech 
Republic, and appears to be developing in Poland to some extent.  One can expect to see 
the same tendency to emerge in the new NATO aspirants.  In spite of the many other 
competing priorities in these states, NATO membership provides all of these fairly small 
states a significant security guarantee at a discounted price.  This guarantee is outlined in 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, which states that “…an armed 
attack against one or more [members]…in Europe or North America shall be considered 
an attack against all…” and that they can expect the assistance necessary from the other 
members of the alliance.284  The case studies seem to indicate that most of the funding 
problems are not due to an inadequate funding request from the various Ministries of 
Defense.  Rather, the lack of funding for the military is due to the state of civil-military 
relations, causing an inability to obtain approval for the amount of military appropriations 
requested.  As retired U.S. Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder pointed out during his 
review of the Czech reform plans, the armed forces of the NATO aspirants must 
“market” themselves by promoting the importance of the military, both internally and 
externally.  It may be that the armed forces of the former Warsaw Pact are politically 
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uncomfortable with this concept.  However, all of the new NATO entrants and aspirants 
lack an effective defense lobby as was noted in the Hungarian case study. 285  As such, 
this need to “market” the military in society is a capability that the new NATO aspirants 
need to develop if they hope to build esteem for the military as well as procure the 
funding they require. 
While additional funding is needed for the military, the castigation of new 
members by NATO officials for the lack of their GDP devoted to their armed forces is 
somewhat unfair.  Outside of the United States, the commitment has receded among most 
NATO members.  As previously noted, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary are 
ranked 6th, 8th, and 11th out of the nineteen NATO members in terms of the percentage of 
GDP they appropriate to their militaries.286  From this perspective, none of them are “free 
riders” as they are sometimes accused.  All three have demonstrated the will to support 
their national defense to the degree of other European states.  However, the inability of 
the 1999 accessants to live up to their promises mentioned previously, as well as the 
small capacity of their economies means that defense budgets will remain inadequate for 
NATO integration to take place very quickly.  Indeed, the 1999 members have not always 
followed the advice of NATO officials regarding the best use of their appropriations to 
support integration.  This can also be seen in the case studies, particularly in the areas 
dealing with the Air Force.  Certainly, it can be expected that the same types of issues 
may arise from time to time with the current NATO aspirants.   
 
C. THE EXPANSION DEBATE 
During the 1990s, political opponents and doubters to NATO expansion were 
both distinguished and passionate.  A few of the more vocal critics included statesmen 
George Kennan and Henry Kissinger; Historian John Lewis Gaddis; Senators John 
Warner, Kay Hutchinson, and Ted Stevens; and New York Times columnist Tom 
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Friedman.287  Numerous academics opposed the expansion of NATO as well.  Many 
were concerned about provoking the Russians.  Most were concerned about the expense 
associated with expansion in comparison to the benefits.  Others were focused on the fact 
that NATO was a military alliance and that pursuits like promoting democracy, 
promotion of free markets, and controlling nuclear non-proliferation are outside the 
alliance charter.288 These critics believed that NATO should concentrate on its military 
capability.  Still others were concerned that more members would cause gridlock in 
NATO’s decision making process.  Since the 1999 round of enlargement, overt criticism 
of expansion has almost entirely subsided.  The experience with the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland has been positive enough to limit criticism aimed at future 
expansion in principle.  Today, very few critics of NATO enlargement remain. 
Based on the case studies, it is clear that all of the 1999 accessants have made 
contributions to the alliance, in the Balkans and elsewhere.  However, their operational 
value is limited.  They are currently “bit players” in NATO’s strategic plans, but are 
slowly taking on greater roles.   It is clear that they are all slowly moving on the right 
path, not only in terms of the redesign of their military, but in terms of the health of their 
democracy and market economy.  The fact that Central Europe has been stable and 
peaceful bodes well for future expansion.   
In spite of their successes, there is still some controversy over the ‘cost of 
enlargement’ debate, partially because the cost is proving difficult to quantify.  Back in 
1997, estimates from the Congressional Budget Office, RAND, the Department of 
Defense and elsewhere to bring the 1999 accessants into the alliance ranged from $10-
billion to an astronomical $100-billion depending on which criteria was used.289  
Currently, NATO estimates that the total cost of enlargement of NATO for the three 1999 
accessants will only cost around $1.5-billion over ten years, most of which will be used 
to fund infrastructure improvements in these countries. The cost to the U.S. is 
approximately 25-percent of this figure, or $400 million over ten years.  Additionally, the 
Congressional Budget Office now reports that the addition of the Czech Republic, 
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Hungary, and Poland to the alliance has reduced the U.S. share of the NATO civil budget 
from 23.3-percent to 22.5-percent, and the military budget from 28.0-percent to 26.2-
percent.  The U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) budget fell 
from 28.3-percent to 25.2-percent.290  While there is still a net cost to the U.S. for 
expansion, the offset described must be considered when assessing the cost of expansion. 
Based on the experience of the 1999 accessants, there is still some criticism that 
persists regarding what the pace of future enlargement should be.  The critics of hasty 
future expansion include Senator John Warner and Professor Zoltan Barany of the 
University of Texas, among others.291  Their arguments are based on the premise that 
NATO remains primarily a military alliance with military contribution being the largest 
factor.  Professor Barany articulates this perspective in his 2003 book, The Future of 
NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies.  Barany sees the Czech Republic and Hungary as  
“free riders.”  He feels that “…both the Czech Republic and Hungary have been less than 
eager contributors to European security since becoming NATO members.”  He feels that 
this attitude shows up as both a lack of enthusiasm, as well as in their budget allocations.  
He notes that, “…before joining, political elites in both states were quick to promise the 
kinds of military reforms that Brussels required.  Once they became members, however, 
their incentives to deliver on those promises had largely disappeared, in large part 
because NATO does not have an expulsion mechanism in place.”  Because of this, 
Barney and others believe that it is imperative that states aspiring to NATO membership 
actually fulfill all stated requirements involved in the MAP before being invited “into the 
tent.”292  Others, including the author of this thesis, believe that the 2004 aspirants can be 
brought along much faster militarily once they are already ‘inside the tent.’  Additionally, 
it should be noted that it is doubtful long-standing members could be said to have 
fulfilled all of the MAP criteria, even now.  NATO integration has always been an 
evolving process for all of its members, regardless of their membership tenure. 
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Perhaps a solution to Professor Barany’s concerns regarding the experience of the 
1999 round of enlargement could be addressed in a manner articulated by Professor 
Charles Gati of John Hopkins University.  Gati feels that the second round of 
enlargement could be articulated to be the beginning of NATO's recovery.  In 2002, Gati 
stated that:  
“Under the circumstances, the second round of enlargement could be -- 
and should be -- the beginning of a process to redefine NATO's mission. 
The new NATO will not be the NATO of the Cold War, and it ought not 
be the NATO that could not find its place after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. It should be a NATO whose primary mission is to maintain and 
expand the zone of political stability from the Atlantic to the Urals.” 293 
 
Gati well articulates what appears to already be the ‘real’ agenda of NATO. 
Perhaps the remaining critics to the new round of expansion could be answered by 
formally articulating this new mission in NATO’s charter, as Gati seems to be 
suggesting. 
  
D. BURDEN SHARING 
Perhaps the lack of enthusiasm and budget shortfalls Barany points to as 
shortcoming of the newest members of the alliance are not isolated to those members at 
all.  Based on the fact that there are numerous nations in the alliance spending a smaller 
percentage of their GDP on defense than the 1999 accessants, perhaps Barany and others 
should be focused on the broader issue of “burden sharing” in general. On a grander 
scale, “easy rider” and “free rider” charges against the 1999 accessants might really be 
just a facit of the burden-sharing problem.  The claims of inequitable burden sharing have 
been a concern of many NATO members almost from the beginning.  It is clear that these 
claims are not going to go away without a commitment by all the alliance members to 
solving the problem once and for all.  Many feel that NATO’s reported ‘fracturing’ or 
‘uncoupling’ could be partially the result of the resentment over inequitable burden 
sharing.294  
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In many ways, the feeling of citizens in the 1999 accessant states is typical of 
many Europeans after the fall of communism.  Now that they are oriented to the West 
and surrounded by democratic neighbors that are also oriented to the West, they are 
unable to see a security threat that involves the military.  They see few purposes for their 
military, and do not seem to feel an overwhelming commitment to the transatlantic 
alliance that insures their security.  Social concerns are their priority.  And from a state-
centric point of view the European public may well be correct – there are no imminent 
ident ifiable security threats to Europe involving the military for the foreseeable future.  
However, from a more strategic point of view, the Europeans are only in this enviable 
position because of the stability fostered by NATO over the long term.  And only by all 
of the members (including the new accessants) living up to the commitment, will the 
alliance continue to serve their security needs at a very reasonable cost to the member 
states.   
In her 2002 article NATOs Price – Shape Up or Ship Out, Celeste Wallander, 
Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, expresses the belief of 
many when she notes that NATO is hampered because many of its members do not live 
up to the standards of the alliance.  More than just burden sharing, she believes these 
commitments include protecting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in member 
countries.  She notes that, once an aspirant state becomes a member, NATO currently 
loses all leverage to induce its members to live up to its membership requirements.  
Wallander surmises that NATO has created a “moral problem” among its members.  She 
notes that this term is often used in financial circles to mean “…a condition in which one 
does not have to pay the price for risk-taking or rule breaking behavior.”  In an equivalent 
way, she notes that membership without enforceable conditions actually create incentives 
for delinquency in the alliance.295   
At this point, it is important to keep in mind the positive role NATO has played in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.  As an organization that is now engaged in 
encouraging new democracies and developing market economies, NATO has already 
proven a success in each case.  However, because the 1999 accessants (as well as other 
members) have now achieved full membership status, NATO has no way to discipline 
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those members if they quit following the rules.  As such, any incentive for members to 
uphold the alliance standards has been lost.  Yet, only through the persistence of common 
values can NATO be effective.  The only way for common values to be maintained is for 
NATO to have the ability to discipline delinquent members.  The ability of NATO to 
issue sanctions or the expulsion of members would give the Ministry of Defense and 
others in each member country the leverage they need to solicit better support from their 
government in order to meet their collective defense commitments.296  Until this takes 
place, the public and politicians in member countries will continue to make the “moral 
hazard calculation” Wallander describes, and there will be little incentive for them to 
support their defense obligations.297  While Wallander’s proposal is excellent, politically, 
it is probably not feasible.  It is difficult to see circumstances that might cause a 
consensus of alliance members to agree to such a proposal any time soon.   
 
E. THE RECORD OF ENLARGEMENT SO FAR 
While the alliance continues to have challenges like burden-sharing just as it 
always has, the record of enlargement is generally a success based on the case studies.  
Contrary to many forecasts, the Balkan wars have not spread to Central or Eastern 
Europe.  One reason for this positive non-event is that NATO's new and old members 
have understood their responsibilities to the extent necessary and have acted accordingly. 
Not only the new members but the new aspirants, too, have contributed to the difficult 
stability emerging in the Balkans.  In contrast to the pre-NATO 20th century period, 
historical and ethnic disagreements, such as those between Hungary and Romania, have 
produced no wars or notable skirmishes.  One reason has been that NATO aspirants do 
not want to spoil their prospects for membership. Without that societal goal, nationalist 
leaders would emerge as they always have and would feel free to exploit these is sues for 
domestic political purposes.  In spite of the challenges, NATO continues to be effective 
because it continues to create non-events, like the hypothetical ones described, at an 
extremely reasonable cost.  All signs indicate that the process of NATO expansion will 
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continue to maximize the chances that Central and Eastern Europe will continue, for the 
first time in its history, to become a region of stable democracies and free markets that 
are cooperative with other Western governments.  From the current vantage point, who 
can criticize the role that NATO enlargement has played to create a better Europe?  
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ADDITIONAL TABLES  
 
















Bulgaria 66,500 N/A N/A N/A 859 
Czech 
Republic 
40,300 2,289 110 None 1,211 
Estonia 5,083 39 None 1 109 
Hungary  35,300 1,790 70 None 925(3) 
Latvia 3,400 15 None None 144 
Lithuania 10,874 105 6 2 200(4)  
Poland 214,900 4,583 292 14 3,052 
Romania 152,600 N/A N/A N/A 980 
Slovakia 35,000 1,452 109 None 387(6)  
Slovenia 9,320 N/A None N/A 299  
Note 
1. Combat Aircraft comprises fixed-wing aircraft capable either of aerial 
combat or ground attack.  
2. Major Naval Vessels comp rises those with OH (over-the-horizon 
capability). This definition includes PFM (Patrol, Fast Missile craft), a class 
which often embraces corvettes  
3. Figure from 1999.  
4. Estimated Figure (2001).  
5. Projected Figure (2002).  
6. Figure from 2001  
Note: Those in ‘Bold’ are the 1999 NATO Accessants.  Others are 2004 NATO Aspirants. 
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http://first.sipri.org/index/php, accessed November 23, 2003.   
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Table 6.  European Allies' Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 1993-2000299 
 







   
Table 7.  Spending for the 1999 NATO Accessants as a percentage of GDP   
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Poland 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.89 1.95 1.95(est.) 
Hungary 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.51 1.6 1.6 -- 
Czech Republic 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 -- 1.9(est.) 
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Table 8.  Central European Allies' Historical and Projected Defense Spending, 1997-2003 





SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from NATO, the Congressional Research Service, the embassies of Hungary and the 
Czech Republic, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the U.S. Department of 
Defense. 
 
                                                 





























Abenheim, Donald. “Strategic Insight: The Big Bang of NATO Enlargement: 
Goetterdaemmerung or Rebirth?”  Strategic Insight. Department of National 
Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 1, 2003.   
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/respResources/si/feb03/europe.asp.  [Accessed April 
15, 2003]. 
________. “Unpublished Narrative regarding an overview some of the History of Events 
leading from the Warsaw Pact to NATO.” October 21, 2003. 
Asmus, Ronald. “NATO 2002: The Agenda Ahead,” Euro-Forum, October 10, 2000.  
http://www.expandnato.org/asmus33.html.  [Accessed April 22, 2003]. 
________. Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era. New 
York. Columbia University Press. 2002.  
Babos, Tibor. “Stumbling Block’s of Hungary’s NATO Integration.” Defense Studies. 
Budapest: Institute of Strategic and Defense Research, 2001. 
“Background Note: Hungary.” Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. U.S. State 
Department. July 2002. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2852.htm. [Accessed 
September 26, 2003]. 
Barany, Zoltan. America’s New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 
NATO. Andrew Michta. Editor. London: University of Washington Press, 1999. 
________. The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies. Cambridge, UK: The 
Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2003. 
Bennett, Magnus. “Czech Army Faces Budget Crunch.”  Prague Post Online, July 24, 
2003. http://www.ocnus.net/artman/publish/article-6285.shtml.  [Accessed 
September 12, 2003]. 
Bobinske, Christopher.  “Poland:NATO Membership is a Tough Test.” The Financial 
Times Limited.  London, England, April 17, 2000. 
Book, Elizabeth G. “Czech Republic Chem-Bio Unit in Kuwait.” National Defense 
Magazine, January 2003. 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1018.  [Accessed 
September 12, 2003]. 
Branston, Jeremy. “Czech Republic: Government Moves to Abolish Conscription, Joins 
European Trend.” Radio Free Europe, August 31, 2001.  
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/08/31082001114832.asp.  [Accessed 
September 12, 2003]. 
________. “NATO: Czech Military Woes Prove Alliance Membership No Cure-All.” 
Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty. November 18, 2002. 
http://www.rferl.org/nca/freatures/2002/11/18112002172545.asp.  [Accessed July 
23, 2003]. 
106 
Congressional Budget Office, “Integrating New Allies into NATO.” CBO Paper. 
Washington, D.C., October 2000. 
Cottey, Andrew, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Foster. ed. The Challenge of Military 
Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces.New 
York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2002. 
 ________. “Military Matters: Beyond Prague,” NATO Review. Autumn 2002.  
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/military.html. [Accessed 
September 25, 2003]. 
________. Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe.  New York: 
Palgrave Publishers Ltd. 2002. 
”Czech Republic Should Protect own Air Space in Future.” Financial Times Information, 
Global News Wire, CTK Czech News Agency. February 22, 2001. 
Davidson Institute Emerging Markets Forecasts (DIEMF): Quarterly Economic Forecasts 
for Central and Eastern Europe. William Davidson Institute. University of 
Michigan. July 15, 2003. 
http://www.wdi.bus.umich.edu/research/forecast/forcast/htm.  [Accessed 
September 9, 2003]. 
Dunay, Pál. “The Armed Forces in the Hungarian Society: Finding a Role?” Chapter 5 of 
Transforming Postcommunist Militaries: Professionalization of the Armed Forces 
in Central and Eastern Europe. University of Bristol, 2001.  
http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/GRC/CMR/TCMR%20Papers/hungarian.pdf. 
[Accessed October 3, 2003]. 
________. “Building Professional Competence in Hungary’s Defense: Slow Motion.” A 
synopsis of a presentation given at a conference organized by ESCR’s 
“Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Context” Research 
Process. July 2001. 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/GRC/CMR/TCMR%20Papers/TMCSR%%201.12.ht
m. [Accessed October 3, 2003]. 
________. “Geneva Center for Security Policy.” A synopsis of his presentation given as 
part of a conference entitled The Armed Forces and Society in Postcommunist 
Europe: Legitimacy and Change; held at Lake Bled in Slovenia. March 14-17, 
2002. Internet site 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/GRC/CMR/TCMR%20Papers/TCMR%201.14.htm. 
[Accessed October 3, 2003].   
 “Economic Readiness and Impact of NATO Membership for Central and Eastern 
Europe: A special Report of the Davidson Institute Emerging Market Forecasts.” 
The William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Business School. 
http://www.wdi.bus.umich.edu/research/forcast/forcast/htm.  [Accessed 
September 9, 2003]. 
Fleming, Michael. “The State to State Partnership Programme.”  NATO Review. May-
June 1997.  http://www.nato.int/doc/review/1997/9703-6.htm.  [Accessed May 1, 
2003]. 
107 
Forest, Frank. “Prague’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Protection Units Contribute 
to Alliance.” The Prague Post Online. November 20, 2002. 
http://www.praguepost.com/PO3/2002/Art/1120/news92.php.  [Accessed 
September 12, 2003].   
“Foreign Policy.” Government Portal. Hungary (HU). 
http://www.ekormanyzat.hu/english?kateg=english:1321. [Accessed July 24, 
2003]. 
________. Democratic Control of the Miltary in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the 
Guardians.  Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York.  Palgrave 
McMillan. 2002. 
Freedom House. http://www.freedomhouse.org. [Accessed September 27, 2003].  
Gabal, Ivan, Lenka Helsusova and Thomas S. Szayna. The Impact of NATO Membership 
in the Czech Republic: Changing Czech Views of Security, Military, and Defense. 
Conflict Studies Research Centre. Royal Military Academy. Sanhurst. March 
2002. 
Gati, Charles. “All That NATO Can Be: To Prague and Beyond.” The National Interest. 
Summer 2002. http://store.yahoo.com/expandnato/gatinato.html. [Accessed 
October 22, 2003].  
Gazdik, Jan and Johanna Grohova. “NATO Membership Transforms Czech Military, 
Boosts National Confidence.” The Prague Post. November 12, 2002. 
http://www.praguepost.com/P)#/2002/Art/1113/news2_mafra.php.  [Accessed 
September 12, 2003].  
Gilmore, Gerry.  “Poland to Take Advisory Role with New NATO Members.”  
DefenseLINK News- Global Security.org.  September 24, 2003.  
http://globalsecurity.org/military/libarary/news/2002/09/mil-020924-dod04b.thm.  
[Accessed October 20, 2003]. 
Gorka, Sebestyén L. “NATO after enlargement: Is the Alliance better off?”  NATO 
Review. Autumn 1999. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9903-10.htm. 
[Accessed April 24, 2003]. 
Graham, Brakely.  “U.S. to Help Finance Polish Peacekeepers; Rumsfeld Assures 
Defense Minister of Aid in Raising Funds for Contingent in Iraq.”  The 
Washington Post. A Section. May 6, 2003. 
Grossman, Marc.  “New capabilities, new members, new relationships.”  NATO Review. 
Summer 2002.  http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue2/english/art2.html.  
[Accessed April 24, 2003]. 
Groves, Jr., John R. “Effective Engagement: The Case of Ecuador.” Joint Force 
Quarterly. A Professional Military Journal. Autumn 2000. 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/summer02.htm.  [Accessed May 3, 
2003]. 
108 
________. PfP and the State Partnership Program: Fostering Engagement and Progress. 
“Parameters.” Spring 1999. http://carlisle-
wwww.army.mil/usawc/parameters/99spring/groves.htm. [Accessed May 3, 
2003]. 
Grudzinski, Przemyslaw. “Case Study: Results of First Round Expansion – Poland’s 
Experience.” NATO in the 21st Century-The Road Ahead.  U.S. Foreign Policy 
Agendya.  An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State.  March 2002.  
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0302/ijpe/toc.htm. [Accessed October 20, 
2003]. 




&#section3. [Accessed September 27, 2003]. 
“Hungarian Defense Minister on Army Reform, Aircraft Purchase Negotiations.” 
Nepszava Web Site. September 13, 2002. BBC Monitoring Europe – Political, 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 
“Hungary: Ex-government Allegedly chose Gripen to Avoid Overseas NATO Tasks.” 
Nepszabadsag. September 9, 2002. Budapest. BBC Monitoring Europe – 
Political. BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 
“Hungary: Many Generals, Officers can expect Sack, Public for Army Reform – Poll,” 
MTI News agency. February 3, 2002. Budapest. BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 
“Hungary will Buy F-16’s from US.” Budapest Magyar Hirlap. February 13, 2001.  
Kagan, Robert.  Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order.  
New York: Random House, 2003. 
Klaiber, Klaus-Peter. “The Membership Action Plan: Keeping NATO’s door open.”  
NATO Review. Summer 1999. http://wwnato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-05.htm.  
[Accessed April 28, 2003]. 
Komorowski, Bronislaw.  “Reforming Poland’s Military.”   NATO Review. Summer 
2001. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0102-08.htm. [Accessed October 22, 
2003]. 
Kovanda, Karel. “Preparing for Membership.” NATO Review. Spring 2003. 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/special.html.  [Accessed 
April 24, 2003]. 
Kuhlmann, Jurgen and Jean Callaghan. ed.  Military and Society in 21st Century Europe, 
A Comparative Analysis. George C. Marshall European Center for Security 
Studies. Hamburg and London: Transaction Publishers, 2000. 
Kupchan, Charles. The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the 
Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Random House, Inc., 2002. 
109 
Latawski, Paul.  The Polish Armed Forces and Society.  Chapter 5 of Transforming 
Postcommunist Militaries: Professionalization of the Armed Forces in Central and 
Eastern Europe, University of Bristol.  2001. 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/GRC/CMR/TCMR%20Papers/Poland.pdf.  
[Accessed October 10, 2003]. 
“Lifecycle of the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) in the U.S. European 
Command (EUCOM) (U).” HQ USEUCOM/ECRA, ECRA-OP. March 7, 2002. 
Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.  Baltimore and 
London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
Michta, Andrew, ed. America’s New allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 
Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1999. 
________. The Soldier-Citizen: The Politics of the Polish Army after Communism. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. 
“National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) in U.S. European Command 
(USEUCOM).” HQ USEUCOM/ECRA, ECRA-OP. August 26, 2002. 
National Guard Bureau Homepage. “International Affairs Directorate FY00 Annual 
Review.” http://www.ngb.army.mil/staff/ia/fy00_review.shtml.  [Accessed May 3, 
2003]. 
National Guard Bureau Homepage. “SPP Information Paper National Guard State 
Partnership Program.” http://www.ngb.army.mil/staff/ia/spp_info_paper.shtml. 
[Accessed May 3, 2003]. 
“NATO Expansion and the Problem of a NATO Strategy.” Global Intelligence Update. 
Red Alert. GlobalBeat.  March 15, 1999. 
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nato/GIU031599.html. [Accessed July 23, 2003]. 
NATO Handbook: 2001, NATO Office of Information and Press. 1110 Brussels, 
Belgium.  
NATO Press Release. “Membership Action Plan (MAP).” Press Release NAC-S(99)66. 
April 24, 1999.  http://www.nato.int.docu.pr/1999/p99-066e.htm.  [Accessed 
April 28, 2003]. 
“NATO Commander Urges Faster Hungarian Military Reform.” Agence France Presse. 
Budapest International News. October 25, 2000.  
“NATO Supreme Commander Praises Hungarian Military Reforms.” International News. 
Associated Press. Worldstream. July 7, 2003. 
Owens, Bill and Troy A. Eid. “Strategic Democracy Building: How U.S. States Can 
Help.” The Washington Quarterly. Autumn 2002. 25:4, pp. 153-168. 
“Plans for NATO Support to Poland’s Iraq Mission Finalized.” NATO Update. June 30, 
2003. http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/06-june/e0630b.htm. [Accessed 
November 24, 2003].   
 
110 
Prague Summit, November 21-22, 2002. “The Road to NATO Membership.”  NATO 
Review.  http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-
prague/more_info/membership.htm.  [Accessed April 17, 2003]. 
“Prime Minister Leszek Miller meets General Joseph Ralston, Supreme Commander.”  
Events, The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland.  July 2, 2002.  
http://www.kprm.gov.pl/english/2130_5144.htm.  [Accessed October 22, 2003]. 
Paquette, Laure.  NATO and Eastern Europe After 2000: Strategic Interactions with 
Poland, The Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria. New York: Nova Science 
Publishers, Inc., 2001. 
“Poland,” Jane’s Sentinel Security assessments – The Balkans. Jane’s. February 11, 2003. 
http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/balksu/h
ungs010.htm@current&QueryText=null&Prod_Name=BALKSU&image=browse
&#section3. [Accessed September 27, 2003]. 
“Poland to Buy Fighter Jets from U.S.”  International Business.  New York Times.  
December 27, 2002. 
Ralston, Joseph W. “Defending Freedom, Fostering Cooperation and Promotion 
Stability” U.S. House of Representatives, Testimony given by EUCOM 
Combatant Commander Ralston to The House Armed Services Committee, 
Washington, D.C., 20 March 2002.   
http://www.house.gov/hasc/openinstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02-
03-20ralston.html.  [Accessed May 3, 2003]. 
________. “Successfully Managing NATO Enlargement,” NATO in the 21st Century – 
The Road Ahead, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda. An Electronic Journal of the U.S. 
Department of State, March 2002.  
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0302/ijpe/toc.htm, [Accessed October 20, 
2003]. 
Rozoff, Rick. “NATO Spends Billions for Czech Military Bases.” Czech Happenings. 
March 13, 2003. http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/view-id.php4?id=20030313F02900. 
[Accessed September 12, 2003]. 
Schroeder, Lt General Daniel, US Army (Retired).  “Assessment of the Reform of the 
Armed forces of the CR.” Defense Ministry of the Czech Republic. June 6, 2002. 
http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=780.  [Accessed July 31, 2003]. 
“Secretariat Report,” Annual Tour, Poland: July 29-August 5, 2001.  NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly. August 31, 2001.  http://www.nato-
pa.int/archivedpub/trip/01annualtour.asp. [Accessed July 23, 2003]. 
“Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century,” Hungarian Defense Mirror, 
Honvedelmi Miniszterium. August 11, 2003. 
http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php=13869. [Accessed September 25, 2003].   
Simon, Jeffrey. NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil Military 
Relation. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press Publications, 
1996. 
111 
________.  Hungary and NATO, Problems In Civil-Military Relations.  Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. 
________.  NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options.  Washington, D.C: National 
Defense University Press Publications, 1995. 
________. New NATO Members: Will they contribute. Strategic Forum. Institute for 
National Strategic Studies. National Defense University. Number 160. April 
1999. 
________. “Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and Eastern Europe.” Strategic 
Forum. Institute for National Strategic Studies. National Defense University, No. 
172, June 2000.  
Sobiepanel, Zofia.  Industry Sector Analysis (ISA); Europe; Poland.  Defense Market. ID: 
109811. May 5, 2003. 
Solana, Javier.  “An Alliance fit for the 21st century: Letter from the Secretary General.”  
NATO Review. Autumn 1999. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9903-
01.htm. [Accessed April 29, 2003]. 
Soloman, Gerald B. The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997, Blessings of Liberty.  
Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1998. 
“Study on NATO Enlargement.” NATO: Online Library, September 1995. 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm. [Accessed July 27, 2003]. 
Stylinski, Andrezej. “NATO Training Center in Poland to Start Operation Within a 
Year.” International News.  Associated Press.  October 20, 2003. 
Szayna, Thomas S. NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for 
Defense Planning and Shaping.  RAND, 2001. 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1243/.  [Accessed July 17, 2003].  
________. “Two Years into NATO: Integration of the Czech Republic in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization from the Viewpoint of the Defense Department - 
BC8554.” Prague: Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic, 2001. 
“The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland.”  
http://www.polishembassy.ca/files/THE%20NATIONAL%20SECRUITY%20ST
RATEGY%20OF%20THE%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20POLAND.pdf. [Accessed 
September 20, 2003].  
“The Weakest Link.” Washington Post, November 5, 2002.   
Tvrdik, Jaroslav. “Effective Membership.” The Prague Summit. November 2002, 
http://www.vlada.cz.  [Accessed September 9, 2003].   
“Two years in NATO: Integration of the Czech Republic in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization from the viewpoint of the Defense Department.” Prague. Ministry of 
Defense of the Czech Republic, 2001. 
“USA to Ask Hungary to Aid War on Terrorism.” Nepszava Web Site. Budapest 
September 6, 2002. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Worldwide 
Monitoring. 
112 
Wallander, Celeste A. “NATO’s Price – Shape Up or Ship Out.” Foreign Affairs. 
December 1, 2002. http://www.expandNATO.org/natosprice.html.  [Accessed 
July 23, 2003]. 
Warner, John W., “NATO Enlargement: We Must Carefully Review and Study the 
Ramifications,” NATO in the 21st Century – The Road Ahead, U.S. Foreign Policy 
Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
March 2002. 
“Wikipedia – The Free Encyclopedia.” http:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visegard_Agreement. 
[Accessed November 14, 2003].  
Zapletnyuk, Katya. “Czech Military Reforms Could End in Ruins,” Transitions Online. 
June 6, 2003. http://www.onus.net/artman/publish/article_5447.shtml.  [Accessed 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Dr. Robert Looney 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
4. Dr. Donald Abenheim 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
5. MajGen Mason C. Whitney  
Colorado National Guard 
Englewood, CO 
 
6. Col Theresa Blumberg 
Colorado National Guard 
Englewood, CO 
 
7. Col Mark Kalber 
National Guard Bureau – International Affairs 
Arlington, Virginia 
 
